The Mongolian People’s Republic: A pioneer of non-capitalist development

Matthew Read

28 Febru­ary 2025

English PDF

Table of contents

  1. Intro­duc­tion
  2. The start­ing point of the People’s Repu­blic (1580 – 1921)
  3. The begin­ning of the “gene­ral demo­cra­tic phase” (1921–1928)
  4. The struggle against Lamaism and Japa­nese impe­ria­lism (1928–1940)
  5. The cons­truc­tion of socia­lism in Mongo­lia (1940 – 1960)
  6. Inte­gra­tion into the Come­con (1960 – 1990)
  7. Mongo­lia and the stra­tegy of “non-capi­ta­list deve­lo­p­ment” in Africa and Asia

Introduction

The Mongo­lian People’s Repu­blic, foun­ded in 1924, was the second state after the Soviet Union in which the immense working masses seized power from their former exploi­ters and set out to cons­truct a socia­list society. Yet in prac­ti­cally every regard, Mongo­lia was even more under­de­ve­lo­ped than its Soviet neigh­bour to the north. The working people were confron­ted with the brutal feudal rule of both the Mongo­lian nobi­lity and the Chinese occu­p­iers. Follo­wing the 1921 revo­lu­tion, the Mongo­lian Peop­le’s Revo­lu­tio­nary Party led the coun­try from a back­ward feudal-theo­cra­tic society through a period of demo­cra­tic trans­for­ma­tion towards an agro-indus­tria­li­zed socia­list economy. Progres­si­vely, and despite many setbacks and chal­lenges, former serfs were lifted out of desti­tu­tion and saw massive impro­ve­ments to their living stan­dards. Educa­tion and health indi­ca­tors confirmed this: Mongo­lia became the first coun­try in Asia to achieve univer­sal liter­acy, while life expec­tancy was consis­t­ently higher than in simi­lar count­ries such as India and Nepal.

The Mongo­lian expe­ri­ence was unique in that the coun­try circum­ven­ted the capi­ta­list stage of deve­lo­p­ment enti­rely. The people’s demo­cra­tic states in Eastern Europe had all previously passed through a period of capi­ta­list deve­lo­p­ment before cons­truc­ting socia­lism. So too had Soviet Russia, to a certain extent. Yet in Mongo­lia and the Central Asian Soviet Repu­blics, an enti­rely new path of so-called “non-capi­ta­list deve­lo­p­ment” had been pionee­red. In the 1960s and 1970s, Marxist-Leni­nist deve­lo­p­ment theo­rists began revi­si­ting Mongolia’s expe­ri­en­ces with the convic­tion that this history could inform deve­lo­p­ment stra­te­gies for the former colo­nies in Africa and Asia. The econo­mies and social struc­tures of these newly inde­pen­dent states had been signi­fi­cantly defor­med by colo­nial rule and explo­ita­tion. Could they too circum­vent capi­ta­lism and advance towards socia­lism like Mongo­lia had?

This article provi­des a rough over­view of Mongolia’s revo­lu­tio­nary period and traces out the deve­lo­p­ment stra­te­gies of Mongo­lian Marxists after 1921. Focus is set largely on the early “gene­ral demo­cra­tic phase” (1921–1940) during which the main task was to push back the power of the dome­stic feudal clas­ses and with­stand impe­ria­list aggres­sion from abroad. These initial deca­des repre­sen­ted the most compli­ca­ted and decisive period of Mongolia’s revo­lu­tion. The article then exami­nes how Mongo­lia cons­truc­ted a unified socia­list plan­ning system and inte­gra­ted itself into the socia­list world economy. The conclu­sion criti­cally reflects on Mongolia’s role in socia­list scho­lar­ship on the theory of “non-capi­ta­list development”.

Our rese­arch is drawn from the works of Mongo­lian and Eastern Euro­pean scho­lars, as well as statis­tics from Western histo­ri­ans. Parti­cu­larly useful were the discus­sions gene­ra­ted by an inter­na­tio­nal acade­mic confe­rence held in Berlin in 1975, which brought toge­ther scho­lars from seven socia­list states. We also inter­viewed the former deputy prime minis­ter of Mongo­lia (2012–2014), Dendev Terbish­dagva, who was one of hundreds of young Mongo­li­ans to study in the German Demo­cra­tic Repu­blic (DDR). His views on Mongolia’s deve­lo­p­ment and chal­lenges helped us assess the legacy of the socia­list period.

The starting point of the People’s Republic (1580 – 1921)

To appre­ciate the signi­fi­cance of the socia­list period, it is neces­sary to under­stand the situa­tion in Mongo­lia prior to the revo­lu­tion. At the begin­ning of the 20th century, Mongo­lian society was domi­na­ted a secu­lar and reli­gious aris­to­cracy that amas­sed their wealth by exploi­ting “Arats”, the noma­dic Mongo­lian herds­men. Arats compo­sed over 90 percent of the popu­la­tion, yet they owned only half the country’s live­stock. The rest was concen­tra­ted in the hands of the nobi­lity, who, prior to the 1921 revo­lu­tion, accoun­ted for just 7.8 percent of the popu­la­tion. Arats were depen­dent on and subject to the feudal lords; they were compel­led to pay tribute in the form of natu­ral taxes, bonded labour, or inden­tu­red servitude.

Mongo­lian nobi­lity (circa 1900). 

While the feudal nobles were the dece­dents of the Genghis Khan era (1162–1227), the Mongo­lian aris­to­cracy had long ceased to be a powerful force in Asia. By the end of the 14th century, the Ming dynasty had defi­ni­tively defea­ted Mongo­lian attempts to re-subju­gate China, and Mongo­lia descen­ded into a long period of disin­te­gra­tion, as nobles fought amongst them­sel­ves for control. In this context of feudal frag­men­ta­tion and chaos, the Mongo­lian aris­to­cracy needed to find an ideo­lo­gi­cal frame­work that could rein­force their explo­ita­tion of the Arats. They found a solu­tion in Tibe­tan Lamaism:

“It was prima­rily the ruling clas­ses who promo­ted the intro­duc­tion of Lamaism. The over­all social and poli­ti­cal situa­tion in Mongo­lia in the 16th century made the ground appear fertile for the new reli­gion. Due to the long wars and poli­ti­cal turm­oil, the coun­try was frag­men­ted into a large number of ruler­ships, there was no econo­mic and poli­ti­cal unity, and the coun­try and its people were comple­tely impo­ve­ris­hed. The ruling clas­ses tried to streng­then their influence and power over the people.

 

Reli­gion – in the form of the Lamaism that had been deve­lo­ped and tested in feudal Tibet – was a suita­ble means of influen­cing the people through ideo­logy. The tradi­tio­nal shaman reli­gion, which was rooted in the pre-class society, could not become an effec­tive ideo­lo­gi­cal power factor in feudal Mongo­lia and ther­e­fore had to be repla­ced by a form of reli­gion adapted to the socio-econo­mic condi­ti­ons.”1

Having emer­ged in commu­nal society where social struc­tures were rela­tively egali­ta­rian and based on kinship ties, shama­nism was a decen­tra­li­zed and rela­tively unor­ga­nised form of reli­gion. The Lamaism that had deve­lo­ped in Tibet, on the other hand, promo­ted hier­ar­chi­cal monastic insti­tu­ti­ons and advan­ced the idea of a divi­nely orda­i­ned social hier­ar­chy. It was thus better suited to legi­ti­mize the noble’s rule over the Arats.

The Mongo­lian aris­to­cracy began import­ing Tibe­tan Lamaism and adap­ting it to Mongo­lian tradi­ti­ons. The first monas­te­ries were built in the 1580s and were gene­rously subsi­di­zed by the secu­lar nobles. Monas­te­ries recei­ved land and live­stock and were gifted “Shabi­nar” (servant fami­lies). To encou­rage the Arats to take up the new reli­gion, the nobles gran­ted privi­le­ges to those who atten­ded monas­tery schools: Lamas were exempt from mili­tary service and taxes and some­ti­mes even given live­stock as a reward. Lamaism helped to legi­ti­mize the contin­ued rule of the feudal lords, but it did not elimi­nate the inter­nal strug­gles within the ruling class. The endu­ring frag­men­ta­tion of the coun­try ulti­m­ately enab­led the Manchu Qing dynasty – which had taken control in China (1644–1911) – to subju­gate most of Mongo­lia by the begin­ning of the 17th century.

With the successful ancho­ring of Lamaism and the intro­duc­tion of Manchu feudal law in Mongo­lia, the Arats now faced double explo­ita­tion: by the foreign Qing rulers and by the secu­lar and reli­gious Mongo­lian lords. The Arats thus fell into two centu­ries of depri­va­tion and foreign rule, with popu­la­tion numbers steadily decli­ned over time. This situa­tion led to great unrest in the early 20th century. Inspi­red by the Chinese revo­lu­tion of 1911, these upri­sings grew into a broad natio­nal libe­ra­tion move­ment. A degree of natio­nal auto­nomy was regai­ned in 1915 after an agree­ment was reached between Russia, the new Repu­blic of China, and the head of the Lamish church in Mongo­lia, Bogd Khan. This new Bogd Khanate remained under heavy Chinese influence and was ulti­m­ately over­thrown in 1919 when China again inva­ded the country.

The Mongo­lian natio­nal move­ment rega­the­red its forces and – inspi­red this time by the success of the Bols­he­viks during the Octo­ber Revo­lu­tion of 1917 – formed the Mongo­lian Peop­le’s Party (MPP) in June 1920. The new party was orga­ni­zed along demo­cra­tic centra­list prin­ci­ples, and its first programme called for an end to foreign rule and the explo­ita­tion of the Arats. At this point, the MPP was a plura­list party held toge­ther by the struggle for natio­nal libe­ra­tion; its members included Arats, Lamas, and even nobles.2 The natio­nal ques­tion overs­ha­dowed the social ques­tion during this period. The MPP sent repre­sen­ta­ti­ves to revo­lu­tio­nary Russia to estab­lish ties with the Bols­he­viks, for the Soviet leaders had been the only ardent support­ers of Mongo­lian independence.

The first leaders of the Mongo­lian People’s Party with Boris Shum­yatsky, foun­der of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Secre­ta­riat (1921).

Under the command of the MPP, the newly estab­lished Mongo­lian People’s Army (MPA) began repel­ling Chinese forces from Mongo­lia. The situa­tion became more compli­ca­ted when tsarist Baron Roman von Ungern-Stern­berg inva­ded Mongo­lia in August 1920. Ungern was able to drive the Chinese out of the capi­tal in Febru­ary 1921 and resto­red Bogd Khan as monarch. In response, the MPA laun­ched an offen­sive against the White Russi­ans. Toge­ther with the Soviet Red Army, the MPA successfully libe­ra­ted the capi­tal in July 1921, marking the victory of the Mongo­lian People’s Revo­lu­tion. A new govern­ment was proclai­med and opera­ted as a consti­tu­tio­nal monar­chy. Bogd Khan’s powers were limi­ted to those of purely symbo­lic nature, while feudal taxes and laws around serf­dom and servi­tude were abolished.

The newly inde­pen­dent Mongo­lia had just 550,000 inha­bi­tants, but was the size of France, Britain, Spain, and Portu­gal combi­ned. The vast majo­rity of the popu­la­tion lived as noma­dic herders in the country’s semi-arid plains.

The beginning of the “general democratic phase” (1921–1928)

Against the back­ground of the Russian Civil War and the anti-Bols­he­vik inva­sion by the Western powers and Japan, an intense and often violent struggle broke out within the MPP to deter­mine the future of Mongo­lia. There was a clear split between the more conser­va­tive natio­na­lists and the Marxists. The latter had travel­led to Moscow in Novem­ber 1921 to nego­tiate an agree­ment between the new Mongo­lian govern­ment and the Soviet Union. During their visit, the MPP dele­ga­tion met with Lenin and asked for his advice on how to proceed with the Mongo­lian revo­lu­tion. Lenin’s response was noted down by the dele­ga­tion and helped to stra­te­gi­cally orient Mongo­lian Marxists in the deca­des ahead:

“Comrade Lenin elabo­ra­ted on the idea that it was possi­ble and neces­sary for the MPR to follow a non-capi­ta­list path of deve­lo­p­ment, the main condi­tion for which was hard work on the part of the People’s Revo­lu­tio­nary Party and the Govern­ment, so that this work and the increased influence of the Party and the autho­ri­ties would result in a growth of the number of co-opera­ti­ves, in the intro­duc­tion of new forms of econo­mic acti­vity and natio­nal culture, and would rally the Arats behind the Party and the Govern­ment in the inte­rests of the country’s econo­mic and cultu­ral deve­lo­p­ment. It was only from the islets of the new econo­mic way of life crea­ted by the efforts of the Party and the Govern­ment that the new non-capi­ta­list econo­mic system of Arat Mongo­lia would take shape.“3

Lenin also encou­ra­ged the Mongo­li­ans to proceed cautiously and main­tain a degree of revo­lu­tio­nary pati­ence. When asked if he thought the MPP should trans­form itself into a commu­nist party, Lenin responded:

“I should not recom­mend it, because one party cannot be ‘trans­for­med’ into another.” Comrade Lenin explai­ned the essence of a Commu­nist Party as a party of the prole­ta­riat, and said: “The revo­lu­tio­na­ries will have to put in a good deal of work in deve­lo­ping state, econo­mic and cultu­ral acti­vi­ties before the herds­man elements become a prole­ta­rian mass, which may even­tually help to ‘trans­form’ the People’s Revo­lu­tio­nary Party into a Commu­nist Party. A mere change of sign­boards is harmful and dangerous.”

After Bogd Khan died in 1924, the Marxists in the MPP seized the moment to gain the upper hand. The govern­ment issued a decree forbid­ding the search for a “new incar­na­tion” of the Khan. At its 3rd Party Congress, the MPP announ­ced that a revo­lu­tio­nary-demo­cra­tic dicta­tor­ship of the labou­ring Arats would be estab­lished under the name of the Mongo­lian People’s Repu­blic (MPR). The Party declared that the coun­try would pursue a path of “non-capi­ta­list deve­lo­p­ment” (NCD) towards socia­lism. The MPP was rena­med as the Mongo­lian Peop­le’s Revo­lu­tio­nary Party (MPRP) and joined the Commu­nist Inter­na­tio­nal. One year later, at the 4th Party Congress, the MPRP fixed scien­ti­fic socia­lism as its guiding ideo­logy and adopted a new programme, which laid out a compre­hen­sive stra­tegy of advan­cing the demo­cra­tic revo­lu­tion along non-capi­ta­list lines before begin­ning with the cons­truc­tion of socia­lism at a later time.4 The Party iden­ti­fied the poor and middle Arats as the social force driving the NCD process: the government’s poli­cies had to streng­then this class and foster their conscious­ness.5

The MPRP govern­ment set up a network of vete­ri­na­rian outposts to help Arats treat their animals with modern medi­cal practices.

The central tasks of this phase were demo­cra­tic and anti-feudal in nature. The MPRP initi­ally procee­ded slowly so as to not antago­nize the former ruling clas­ses before Arat power had been properly conso­li­da­ted. During the first four years, basic econo­mic infra­struc­ture was built, such as a natio­nal bank (a joint venture with the USSR), a new currency, a postal system, and a state trading company.6 Small-scale handi­crafts were encou­ra­ged to deve­lop, as was simple commo­dity produc­tion amongst the Arats. Trade and dome­stic commerce were domi­na­ted by the private sector, with many trading firms being owned by Chinese and Anglo-Ameri­can busi­ness­men. To assist the Arats, the MPRP initia­ted plans to cons­truct live­stock protec­tion fences and haymaking stati­ons to feed cattle. The first facto­ries were cons­truc­ted in the capi­tal with Soviet assis­tance. By 1928, exter­nal trade with the USSR had risen to account for 15 percent of imports and 20 percent of exports.7 To draw Arats into the manage­ment of society, the new consti­tu­tion estab­lished “Khurals” (popu­lar assem­blies) as organs of people’s power.

The struggle against Lamaism and Japanese imperialism (1928–1940)

A serious chall­enge confron­ting the MPRP was the ques­tion of Lamaism and this has been one of the most contro­ver­sial aspects of Mongolia’s revo­lu­tio­nary period. To under­stand the MPRP’s approach to Lamaism during the gene­ral demo­cra­tic phase, it is neces­sary to reco­gnize both the histo­ri­cal role of the clergy within Mongo­lian society and the inter­na­tio­nal context of the 1920s and 1930s. This was a period of acute inter­na­tio­nal class struggle in which anti-commu­nist forces sought to anni­hi­late the Soviet Union and the wider commu­nist world move­ment. By 1926/27, two direct thre­ats to Mongo­lian sove­reig­nty had crysta­li­zed: Japa­nese impe­ria­lism and the Kuom­in­tang under Chiang Kai-shek. These deve­lo­p­ments forced the MPRP and the Comin­tern to conclude that war was on the hori­zon and take drastic prepa­ra­tory measu­res. The period from 1928 to 1945 was thus a parti­cu­larly turbu­lent phase of the revo­lu­tion, as the MPRP and Comin­tern strug­g­led to over­come what they self-criti­cally descri­bed as their own right-wing and left-wing devia­ti­ons during this struggle.

By the 20th century, Lamaism had become deeply embedded in Mongo­lian society, both cultu­rally and econo­mic­ally. Prior to the revo­lu­tion in 1921, monas­te­ries held a mono­poly over educa­tion and health­care services. There was only one single public school with just two teachers and roughly 100 pupils opera­ting in pre-revo­lu­tio­nary Mongo­lia. All other schools were control­led by the clergy. The almost abso­lute illi­ter­acy of the Arats meant that clerics were able to exert great influence over the masses. Only 0.5 percent of the total popu­la­tion could read and write in Mongo­lian. The clergy’s teachings were ideo­lo­gi­cally reac­tion­ary and, what is more, the Lamaist doctrine objec­tively hinde­red econo­mic deve­lo­p­ment. Irra­tio­nal Buddhist prin­ci­ples discou­ra­ged basic agri­cul­tu­ral prac­ti­ces such as crop culti­va­tion to feed cattle because the killing of living orga­nisms (even plants) was suppo­sedly a sin.

Feudal forms of punish­ment against the Arats were wide­spread in Mongo­lia prior to the revo­lu­tion. This woman was condem­ned to starve to death (1913). Photo: Stéphane Passet.

Along­side their cultu­ral role, the monas­te­ries repre­sen­ted a signi­fi­cant econo­mic factor in the coun­try. In 1918, the clergy’s property accoun­ted for more than 20 percent of Mongolia’s wealth (the secu­lar nobi­lity held another 25 percent). Monas­te­ries had accu­mu­la­ted a large portion of the country’s live­stock and ran exten­sive trade and finan­cial opera­ti­ons that exploi­ted poorer and middle Arats. The clergy’s profits were not reinves­ted produc­tively into the produc­tion process, but simply accu­mu­la­ted in the monasteries.

All this led the monas­te­ries to natu­rally become rally­ing points for the coun­ter­re­vo­lu­tion. Those who sought to retain their privi­le­ges in society or desta­bi­lize Mongo­lia from within found co-conspi­ra­tors in the 700+ monas­te­ries throug­hout the coun­try. During the early years, the MPRP had imple­men­ted soft poli­cies against the monas­te­ries and took a flexi­ble approach towards the tens of thou­sands of lamas. The most explo­ita­tive Lamaist prac­ti­ces (e.g., inden­tu­red servi­tude) were banned imme­dia­tely, but the monas­te­ries were not expro­pria­ted or heavily taxed. The number of lamas in fact increased from 87,300 in 1925 to almost 95,000 by 1928.8 At this time, the MPRP focu­sed on crea­ting publicly owned infra­struc­ture to break the monas­te­ries’ mono­poly on social services. Mass liter­acy campaigns were initia­ted, and, by 1930, over 120 schools had been built throug­hout the coun­try.9 The offi­cial sepa­ra­tion of church and state was declared in 1926.

Mongolia’s first public hospi­tal was opened in the capi­tal city Ulaan­baa­tar in 1925.

By the end of the decade, the inter­na­tio­nal situa­tion had dete­rio­ra­ted consider­a­bly. Chiang Kai-shek initia­ted his attack on the Chinese commu­nists in 1926 with the so-called Canton Coup. The Kuom­in­tang govern­ment, which conso­li­da­ted its grip over China by 1928, refu­sed to reco­gnize Mongo­lia as an inde­pen­dent state. In 1927, Japa­nese war plans (the so-called “Tanaka Memo­rial”) had also been leaked to the inter­na­tio­nal media, reve­al­ing how Tokyo sought to conquer Mongo­lia and Manchu­ria as gate­ways to taking over China.

Against this back­ground, there was conten­tious debate within the MPRP about how to proceed with the revo­lu­tion. The party leader­ship at the time was uphol­ding a mode­rate dome­stic policy towards the nobi­lity and pursuing rappro­che­ment with both Japan and anti-commu­nist China.10 The posi­tion of the right-wing leader­ship towards the nobi­lity was expres­sed by the MPRP’s Chair­man, Tseren-Ochiryn Damba­dorj, at the 5th Party Congress in 1926:

“The former feudal lords as a poli­ti­cal force within the coun­try are a dead weight, inca­pa­ble of fight­ing for poli­ti­cal power. There is no need to expect any action against the revo­lu­tio­nary order from their side. They are poli­ti­cally dead.“11

Left-wing elements within the MPRP were pushing back against this line. Certain party cells, parti­cu­larly those outside the cities, were calling for more rigo­rous initia­ti­ves to streng­then the Arats and resist the encroa­ching power of the nobi­lity. This tendency came came to be known as the “Khödöö Oppo­si­tion” (Oppo­si­tion of the rural areas) by the mid-1920s.12 An open confron­ta­tion broke out at the next party congress in 1927, when the leader­ship was criti­ci­zed for “pro-capi­ta­list tenden­cies”. Yet the leader­ship mana­ged to defend its posi­tion. The left-wing oppo­si­tion did not yield and secu­red a first victory at the natio­nal trade union congress in Septem­ber 1928, when they successfully elec­ted a new leader­ship. The left wing of the mass youth orga­niza­tion was able to do the same a few weeks later. The oppo­si­tion then united behind the so-called “Plat­form of the Members of the Left Wing”, which they presen­ted to the MPRP Central Commit­tee.13

Alar­med by the inter­nal party conflict and the dete­rio­ra­ting inter­na­tio­nal situa­tion, the Far East Bureau of the Comin­tern began sending letters to the MPRP’s leader­ship in 1927 to urge a diffe­rent course of action. Pavel Mif, the provost of the Comintern’s Sun Yat-sen Univer­sity in Moscow, wrote that the Mongo­lian revo­lu­tio­na­ries had “elimi­na­ted the feudal poli­ti­cal order, but had not broken the econo­mic power of the feudal lords and clerics.”14 The MPRP’s leader­ship rejec­ted this analy­sis and star­ted to break off rela­ti­ons with the Comin­tern. The Far East Bureau then sent Bohumír Šmeral, a co-foun­der of the Commu­nist Party of Czechos­lo­va­kia, to lead a Comin­tern dele­ga­tion at the MPRP’s 7th Party Congress in 1928. Šmeral ener­ge­ti­cally supported the plat­form of the left wing, while trying to mode­rate their accu­sa­ti­ons against the “right-wing trai­tors”.15 At the Congress, he presen­ted the Comintern’s analy­sis that the poli­ti­cal alli­ance with the feudal clas­ses had been neces­sary until 1924 but should now be conside­red outda­ted. The nobi­lity had been able to retain their econo­mic power and were begin­ning to use it to regain poli­ti­cal domi­nance. Mongo­lia had reached a cross­roads: either complete the anti-feudal revo­lu­tion or allow the feudal lords to retain power and conti­nue conspi­ring with the Japa­nese and Chinese.

The clash between the two factions caused the 7th Congress to drag on for over a month and a half. At the closing elec­tions, the left wing won the majo­rity of the seats in the Central Commit­tee and initia­ted a shift in the party’s line. Follo­wing recom­men­da­ti­ons by the Comin­tern, the MPRP now set out to streng­then the poorer and middle Arats while curtail­ing the power of the wealthy. The objec­tive was to two-fold: to break the econo­mic power of the feudal lords and clerics and to rapidly acce­le­rate indus­tria­liza­tion by over­co­ming unpro­duc­tive feuda­list prac­ti­ces in agri­cul­ture. Accor­din­gly, over 700 proper­ties belon­ging to the secu­lar nobi­lity were confis­ca­ted and distri­bu­ted amongst the Arats. Feudal estates were broken up and the land was natio­na­li­zed, making pastu­re­land free to access for all Arats. Trans­por­ta­tion and retail services were natio­na­li­zed, and the state impo­sed a mono­poly on foreign trade to drive out foreign capi­tal.16

Taxa­tion laws were comple­tely rewrit­ten in an attempt to alle­viate the poorer and middle Arats while incre­asing taxes on the feudal lords, the clergy, and the richer Arats. This new taxa­tion system was also devi­sed to disin­cen­ti­vize Lamaism: by remo­ving tax privi­le­ges for lamas, it discou­ra­ged young Mongo­li­ans from joining the monas­te­ries. The enorm­ous cattle herds concen­tra­ted in the monas­te­ries (repre­sen­ting 24.5 percent of all live­stock in 1926) was redis­tri­bu­ted to the poorer Arats, who could now super­vise the cattle on a contrac­tual basis with the state.17 The monas­te­ries them­sel­ves were, howe­ver, permit­ted to conti­nue opera­ting as reli­gious insti­tu­ti­ons.18 The crea­tion of agri­cul­tu­ral coope­ra­ti­ves was greatly acce­le­ra­ted. Rather than exten­ding the exis­ting coope­ra­tive struc­tures that had been based on basic mutual aid amongst Arats (e.g., sharing the burden of hay harve­s­t­ing), the autho­ri­ties now sought to create large commu­nes that would coll­ec­ti­vize cattle owner­ship and crop culti­va­tion on a mass scale. At the same time, the MPRP opened its ranks to masses of applicants.

These poli­cies amoun­ted to an all-out class war against the exploi­ting clas­ses in Mongo­lia. While the gene­ral orien­ta­tion was formu­la­ted as a response to the coun­ter­re­vo­lu­tio­nary and impe­ria­list thre­ats, the extent and speed of the new poli­cies proved too great. The new state-run services in trans­port and retail had been hastily thrown toge­ther and strug­g­led to cope with their new tasks. The new tax system back­fi­red, as richer Arats chose to slaugh­ter their live­stock rather than pay the higher taxes. Many poorer lamas and workers were left without inco­mes after the econo­mic acti­vi­ties of the monas­te­ries were curtailed. The private handi­craft sector was suffo­ca­ted out of exis­tence, although no coope­ra­tive or state struc­tures exis­ted to replace it. Finally, the coll­ec­ti­vi­sa­tion drive in agri­cul­ture had been a fail­ure. The initia­tive had been inspi­red by the “Great Break” in the USSR, yet the natio­nal condi­ti­ons in Mongolia’s noma­dic agri­cul­ture diffe­rent greatly from those in Soviet Russia. By 1930, over 600 coope­ra­ti­ves and commu­nes had been crea­ted out of the hundreds of thou­sands of priva­tely run Arat opera­ti­ons.19 At times, the autho­ri­ties had equa­ted middle and richer Arats with the feudal nobi­lity and used admi­nis­tra­tive measu­res to force entry into communes.

Against this back­ground, discon­tent spread throug­hout the coun­try­side and coun­ter­re­vo­lu­tio­nary forces mobi­li­zed to exploit the situa­tion. The unrest clima­xed in 1932 when wealthy lamas led a series of armed upri­sings against the govern­ment. Many of the insur­gents rallied support­ers by clai­ming to be supported by Tibe­tan lamas and the Japa­nese. They targe­ted state-owned and coope­ra­tive faci­li­ties, laying waste to much of the progress achie­ved since 1924. The MPA was able to subdue the insur­gents within a few months, but great econo­mic damage had been done.

Self-criti­cally reflec­ting on the situa­tion, the MPRP pulled back and rever­sed many of their measu­res from 1928. A “New Turn” policy was announ­ced in 1932 to correct the “left-wing devia­ti­ons” and return to the “gene­ral line” the MPRP had set out for the non-capi­ta­list path of deve­lo­p­ment at their 3rd Party Congress in 1924. At an extra­or­di­nary plenary session in 1932, the party concluded that too many cadres had belie­ved an “imme­diate tran­si­tion to socia­lism” was possi­ble in Mongo­lia; they had “mecha­ni­cally copied the methods of socia­list cons­truc­tion that had been applied in the USSR”.20 The party had orien­ted itself exclu­si­vely around the poorest Arats while isola­ting itself from the middle and wealt­hier Arats. To correct these mista­kes, the “New Turn” orde­red agri­cul­tu­ral commu­nes to be dismant­led and the private initia­ti­ves of the Arats to once again be encou­ra­ged. Some of the rest­ric­tions levied against the monas­te­ries were lifted. At the same time, the MPRP member­ship, which had increased four-fold between 1930 and 1932, was greatly redu­ced to reverse the “ultra-leftist” opening of the party.21

While these measu­res helped to stabi­lize the economy and the social situa­tion, they did not solve the funda­men­tal contra­dic­tion between Lamaism and the natio­nal-demo­cra­tic revo­lu­tion. In 1934 – 10 years after the foun­ding of the People’s Repu­blic – there were still some 80,000 lamas active in hundreds of monas­te­ries across Mongo­lia.22 The MPRP would have to find a solu­tion to this predi­ca­ment; orga­ni­zed Lamaism still repre­sen­ted an econo­mic and poli­ti­cal obsta­cle on the path towards socialism.

The “Hokus­hin-ron”: Japan’s plans to expand northward by inva­ding first Manchu­ria, then Mongo­lia, and finally the USSR. The comman­ding Japa­nese gene­ral, Kenki­chi Ueda, main­tai­ned that commu­nism was Japan’s main enemy. The victory of the Mongo­lian Peop­le’s Army and the Soviet Red Army at the Batt­les of Khalk­hin Gol (1939) ensu­red that Japa­nese impe­ria­lism did not progress beyond Phase One.

In the mid-1930s, the conflicts on the world stage inten­si­fied even further. Japan inva­ded Manchu­ria in 1931 and set up a puppet state that soon began provo­king border conflicts with Mongo­lia. Two years later, fascists took power in Germany and openly declared their inten­ti­ons to destroy the Soviet Union. In this context, the MPRP deci­ded the coun­try could lose no more time: the “gene­ral demo­cra­tic period” – which repre­sen­ted an inher­ently vola­tile and thus vulnerable tran­si­tio­nary phase of the revo­lu­tion – had to be concluded. The govern­ment intro­du­ced a massive state-led indus­tria­liza­tion initia­tive that led to a 22-fold increase in indus­trial output between 1933 to 1940.23 Strict taxes were once again levied against monas­te­ries as part of a wider crack­down on Lamaism. After Japan’s full-scale inva­sion of China in 1937 and its attacks on the Soviet Union in 1938, unspa­ring purges swept through the MPRP and state appa­ra­tus to target alle­ged Japa­nese colla­bo­ra­tors. A violent crack­down on the clergy dealt a defi­ni­tive blow to Lamaism. Just weeks after these purges had been suspen­ded, Japa­nese troops laun­ched attacks on Mongo­lia. In the Batt­les of Khalk­hin Gol, Mongo­lian and Soviet forces were ulti­m­ately able to defeat the Japa­nese inva­ders and drive them out of the country.

Troops of the Mongo­lian Peop­le’s Army resis­ting a Japa­nese coun­ter­at­tack during the Batt­les of Khalak­hin Gol (1939).

By the end of the 1930s, the econo­mic and social power of the feudal clas­ses had been comple­tely broken. The monas­te­ries were now fully expro­pria­ted, and all live­stock was in the hands of working Arats. The MPRP had, howe­ver, concluded from the mista­kes of the late 1920s that agri­cul­ture was still too under­de­ve­lo­ped for coope­ra­tive struc­tures, so cattle remained under the private owner­ship of the herds­men. Foreign capi­tal had been successfully pushed out of the economy: while in 1926 foreign firms had control­led over 60 percent of Mongolia’s total exports, by 1929 this number had decea­sed to 14,5 percent. At the end of the 1930s, foreign owner­ship was prac­ti­cally elimi­na­ted.24

During its 10th Party Congress in 1940, under the shadow of the Second World War, the MPRP declared that the tasks laid out in the second party programme from 1925 had been achie­ved: the gene­ral demo­cra­tic phase was complete, and the path of non-capi­ta­list deve­lo­p­ment could no longer be rever­sed.25 A solid indus­trial base had been estab­lished, with indus­try now accoun­ting for over 20 percent of the country’s total produc­tion.26 For a coun­try with prac­ti­cally zero manu­fac­ture prior to the revo­lu­tion, this repre­sen­ted a remar­kable feat of moder­niza­tion in just 16 years. The 10th Congress thus adopted a third poli­ti­cal programme to set out the tasks for the coming phase of socia­list cons­truc­tion. The coll­ec­tive nature of the Party’s leader­ship was also rein­sta­ted follo­wing the period of intense inter­nal purges (1937–39). At the 8th Grand Khural (natio­nal parlia­ment) in 1940, a new consti­tu­tion was adopted to reflect the new stage of the revo­lu­tion and the trans­for­ma­tion of Mongolia’s class structure:

“The Mongo­lian People’s Repu­blic is an inde­pen­dent state of the working people (the Arat herds­men, the working class, and the intel­li­gent­sia), who have thrown off the impe­ria­list and feudal yoke, ensu­ring a non-capi­ta­list path of deve­lo­p­ment for the coun­try to pave the way for socia­lism.”27

The gene­ral demo­cra­tic phase repre­sen­ted the most turbu­lent period of Mongolia’s revo­lu­tion and the 1930s were undoub­tedly the culmi­na­tion point of this process, when the struggle between the revo­lu­tio­na­ries and the aris­to­cracy escala­ted into full-blown class warfare. Today, domi­nant histo­ri­cal accounts often decon­tex­tua­lize the MPRP’s poli­cies to paint the picture of an inex­pli­ca­bly tyran­ni­cal ruling party. This ahis­to­ri­cal approach not only down­plays the brutal reali­ties of feudal rule in pre-revo­lu­tio­nary Mongo­lia, but also igno­res the role played by the secu­lar and reli­gious aris­to­cracy in actively resis­ting social progress for the labou­ring Arats after 1921. What is more, one only has to look to China – where Japa­nese impe­ria­lism pilla­ged and slaugh­te­red milli­ons of civi­li­ans while ally­ing with colla­bo­ra­tio­nist forces in the Kuom­in­tang – to see that the thre­ats facing Mongo­lia in the 1930s were very real.

Lamaism posed a parti­cu­larly diffi­cult chall­enge for the revo­lu­tion because it was so deeply entren­ched in Mongo­lian society. It was one thing to break the econo­mic and poli­ti­cal power of the reli­gious aris­to­cracy, but it was another to push back the cultu­ral influence of Buddhism. While the MPRP deve­lo­ped public infra­struc­ture (e.g., schools, medi­cal faci­li­ties, etc.) to reduce the influence of the monas­te­ries, the govern­ment also prohi­bi­ted cultu­ral tradi­ti­ons at the lowest levels (e.g., banning shri­nes, etc.) in its attempt to encou­rage ratio­na­lism. It was not uncom­mon for such poli­cies to inad­ver­t­ently provoke the ire of sections of the popu­la­tion. Like many other revo­lu­tio­nary states in the 20th century, the Mongo­lian People’s Repu­blic strug­g­led to navi­gate the irra­tio­nal and often oppres­sive tradi­ti­ons of the past.

The construction of socialism in Mongolia (1940 – 1960)

The years of the Second World War marked an inter­lude in Mongolia’s deve­lo­p­ment, with assis­tance from the USSR drying up. Mongo­lia was finan­cing mili­tary units for the Soviet war effort and supplied the USSR with food, raw mate­ri­als, clot­hing, and half a million mili­tary horses. Follo­wing the defeat of German and Japa­nese impe­ria­lism in 1945, the MPRP resu­med plans to begin with the cons­truc­tion of socia­lism. The first five-year plan was draf­ted in 1947, with a focus on deve­lo­ping cattle bree­ding. This was by far the largest sector of the economy and thus initi­ally set the tempo of all other sectors. 90 percent of Mongolia’s cattle was in the hands of indi­vi­dual Arats during these years. The govern­ment sought to encou­rage an increase of live­stock while also laying the ground­work for the even­tual estab­lish­ment of large-scale agri­cul­tu­ral coope­ra­ti­ves. Tax bene­fits and loans helped to foster the private opera­ti­ons of the Arats.28 The state also laun­ched initia­ti­ves to increase access to modern equip­ment and create new vete­ri­na­rian and hay harve­s­t­ing stati­ons.29 By the end of the first five-year period in 1952, the number of live­stock had increased by almost 9 percent.30

During this post-war period, Mongolia’s indus­tries also made a signi­fi­cant step forward: between 1940 and 1950, gross indus­trial produc­tion increased by 285 percent.31 The sector was domi­na­ted by light indus­tries for the proces­sing of agri­cul­tu­ral products. In 1947, consu­mer goods accoun­ted for 76 percent of indus­trial produc­tion. The Party now set out to expand Depart­ment 1 (the sphe­res of produc­tion that produce new means of produc­tion) to acce­le­rate the growth of Mongolia’s economy. The share of indus­trial goods in total produc­tion there­af­ter increased from 24.3 percent (1947) to 39.9 percent (1957) and finally to 50.9 percent (1960). Along­side the deve­lo­p­ment of heavy indus­try, trans­port infra­struc­ture was greatly expan­ded. The Trans-Mongo­lian Rail­way (comple­ted in 1955) helped to deepen the econo­mic links with the USSR and other socia­list states.

The elec­tri­fi­ca­tion of Mongo­lia was advan­ced through econo­mic and tech­no­lo­gi­cal coope­ra­tion agree­ments with the other socia­list states.

A core compo­nent of socia­list cons­truc­tion in Mongo­lia was the reor­ga­niza­tion of agri­cul­ture into a coope­ra­tive-based sector. After the bitter lessons of the early 1930s, the MPRP had only encou­ra­ged basic coope­ra­tion amongst the Arats, who worked as indi­vi­dual petty commo­dity produ­cers selling goods on the market to each other and the state. Yet the condi­ti­ons in Mongo­lia had chan­ged signi­fi­cantly since then. The indus­tries had made signi­fi­cant stri­des, and a system of compre­hen­sive econo­mic plan­ning had been intro­du­ced in 1947. To conti­nue along the path to socia­lism, it was deemed neces­sary to both inte­grate agri­cul­ture into the plan­ning system and intro­duce a ratio­nal distri­bu­tion of the labour force, much of which was curr­ently tied up in the inef­fi­ci­ent prac­tice of private cattle rearing.

In the early 1950s, the MPRP began to lay the foun­da­ti­ons for grea­ter coope­ra­tion in agri­cul­ture by intro­du­cing manage­ment and accoun­ting trai­ning along with prefe­ren­tial tax rates for coope­ra­ti­ves.32 As the decade progres­sed, it became clear that the system of indi­vi­dual petty commo­dity produc­tion was slowing down the Mongo­lian economy. For almost the entire period between 1941 and 1959, the plan targets for animal products were not reached.33 At the 12th Party Congress in 1954, the MPRP attri­bu­ted the slow progress in agri­cul­ture to the fact that the cattle bree­ding sector was run by hundreds of thou­sands of scat­te­red petty produ­cers. Such rela­ti­ons of produc­tion preven­ted the effec­tive intro­duc­tion of modern tech­no­logy and methods in agri­cul­ture. This situa­tion repre­sen­ted, as the Mongo­lian histo­rian D. Sodnom­gombo concluded, a “non-antago­ni­stic contra­dic­tion between the econo­mic sectors”.34

The coope­ra­tive move­ment was thus resu­med in 1956. At this time, petty commo­dity produ­cing Arats made up 73.9 percent of the popu­la­tion.35 Since land had alre­ady been natio­na­li­zed in 1928, the central ques­tion was the degree to which Mongolia’s live­stock and harve­s­t­ing opera­ti­ons should be coll­ec­ti­vi­sed. By the end of the second five-year plan in 1958, over 200,000 private Arat opera­ti­ons had been merged into 700 negd­els (agri­cul­tu­ral coope­ra­ti­ves).36 Roughly 70 percent of the country’s live­stock was jointly owned by and cared for in the negd­els, while 24 percent contin­ued to be priva­tely owned by members of the coope­ra­ti­ves who could breed them for indi­vi­dual use.37 As members of negd­els, Arats also had the right to run their own private plots.

The reor­ga­ni­sa­tion of agri­cul­ture into coope­ra­ti­ves facil­li­ta­ted the intro­duc­tion of modern tech­no­logy such as elec­tri­cal sheep shee­ring equipment.

The comple­tion of the agri­cul­tu­ral coope­ra­tive move­ment was iden­ti­fied as a major mile­stone in Mongolia’s cons­truc­tion of socia­lism. The 13th Party Congress in 1958 concluded that the coun­try had been “trans­for­med from a purely cattle-bree­ding coun­try into an agro-indus­tria­li­sed state.”28 After a nati­on­wide debate, a new consti­tu­tion was adopted in 1960 to reflect the comple­tion of the non-capi­ta­list path of deve­lo­p­ment. The People’s Repu­blic was now descri­bed as “a socia­list state of the workers, the coope­ra­tively orga­ni­zed Arats, and the working intel­li­gent­sia”. In accordance with the indus­tria­liza­tion of the coun­try, the propor­tion of working-class repre­sen­ta­tion within both the Party and the natio­nal assem­bly grew rela­tive to the propor­tion of Arat representation.

Sources: Sodnom­gombo (1975), Gavri­lov (1975), Mähr­del (1975), Siebeck (1982).

Indus­tria­liza­tion and coll­ec­ti­vi­sa­tion had major impacts on Mongo­lian society. The size of the working class grew from just 14,800 (1940) to 74,200 (1959), while the share of the labour force enga­ged in agri­cul­ture drop­ped from 90 percent (1940) to 60 percent (1960).39 Only 2 percent of Mongolia’s popu­la­tion had lived in urban areas before the 1921 revo­lu­tion, but that number increased to over 40 percent by 1963.40

Compared with the other socia­list states, Mongolia’s indus­tries were still rudi­men­tary, but this moder­niza­tion drive was highly signi­fi­cant for living and educa­tion stan­dards in the coun­try. By the 1960s, illi­ter­acy had been prac­ti­cally elimi­na­ted. Child­ren were enrol­led in primary educa­tion and thou­sands of young Mongo­li­ans were trai­ning to become engi­neers, doctors, vete­ri­na­ri­ans, econo­mists, etc. Compre­hen­sive health care initia­ti­ves helped to raise hygiene stan­dards and vacci­nate people against preven­ta­ble dise­a­ses. With the estab­lish­ment of agri­cul­tu­ral coope­ra­ti­ves, the rural popu­la­tion was also guaran­teed a stable income and Arats were entit­led to holi­days and pensi­ons. These new social rights were achie­ved against the back­ground of a rapidly growing society. While the size of the popu­la­tion gradu­ally decli­ned under feuda­lism in the centu­ries prior to the revo­lu­tion, Mongolia’s popu­la­tion doubled between 1918 and 1962, from 542,000 to over 1 million. By the end of the socia­list era in 1990, it had increased fourfold.

Integration into the Comecon (1960 – 1990)

While the coll­ec­ti­vi­sa­tion drive had not been easy, the MPRP’s econo­mic ratio­nale proved well-foun­ded. The inte­gra­tion of agri­cul­ture into a unified socia­li­zed natio­nal economy laid the basis for impres­sive econo­mic growth in the 1960s. Indus­trial produc­tion per capita increased by 240 percent over the course of the 3rd and 4th five-years plans (1962–1972). This, in turn, helped advance the mecha­niza­tion of agri­cul­ture.41 Arats released from the labour-inten­sive private cattle bree­ding opera­ti­ons now made up the work­force for the new industries.

A major factor in Mongolia’s prono­un­ced econo­mic deve­lo­p­ment after the Second World War was its ties with the other socia­list states. Viewed from the perspec­tive of profi­ta­bi­lity, Mongolia’s social and clima­tic condi­ti­ons made the coun­try an unat­trac­tive desti­na­tion for foreign invest­ments. While the coun­try was rich in natu­ral resour­ces such as copper and coal, a considera­ble capi­tal outlay was requi­red for extra­c­tion and proces­sing. The lack of dome­stic tech­no­logy and exper­tise made it impos­si­ble to estab­lish extra­c­tive indus­tries alone. This reality plagues capi­ta­list Mongo­lia today.

During the socia­list period, howe­ver, the People’s Repu­blic had been able to delink from the capi­ta­list world economy and move beyond a depen­dency on foreign capi­tal. By 1960, trade with the socia­list bloc alre­ady accoun­ted for 94 percent of Mongolia’s exports and 76 percent of imports.42 Finance for deve­lo­p­ment was coming from the socia­list bloc at very favoura­ble rates. Most importantly, socia­list part­ners were not running private opera­ti­ons in Mongo­lia to siphons off the country’s wealth but were instead support­ing publicly owned or joint venture enter­pri­ses. This meant that the country’s surplus product could be accu­mu­la­ted in a plan­ned manner and reinves­ted in the economy to expand the indus­trial base and fund social progress.

The socia­list trade rela­ti­ons took on a quali­ta­tively new charac­ter after 1962, when Mongo­lia became the first non-Euro­pean state to join the socia­list bloc’s econo­mic commu­nity, the Coun­cil for Mutual Econo­mic Assis­tance (Come­con). This shift from bila­te­ral to multi­la­te­ral trade rela­ti­ons meant that the Mongo­lian economy could be gradu­ally inte­gra­ted into a socia­list inter­na­tio­nal divi­sion of labour. The plan­ned trans­fer of know­ledge and tech­no­logy that follo­wed helped to propel the mate­rial and tech­ni­cal basis of the Mongo­lian economy. Agri­cul­tu­ral comple­xes, geology labo­ra­to­ries, and mining opera­ti­ons were set up with the help of the other socia­list states.43

Erde­net, the second-largest city in Mongo­lia today, arose around the massive Soviet-Mongo­lian copper mining opera­ti­ons that began in the mid-1970s.

In capi­ta­list world trade, it is typi­cal for an indus­tria­li­zed capi­ta­list power to import primary commo­di­ties from a former colony and export manu­fac­tu­red goods in return. The serves to deepen rela­ti­ons of depen­dency, as the former colony is not only preven­ted from indus­tria­li­zing, but also suffers a dete­rio­ra­tion in the terms of trade over time. Under­stan­ding this reality, the more deve­lo­ped socia­list states did not seek to simply buy raw mate­ri­als and supply consu­mer goods to less deve­lo­ped states in Asia and Africa. Rather, they inves­ted in (publicly owned or joint venture) infra­struc­ture and proces­sing indus­tries on the ground to foster long-term deve­lo­p­ment. In Mongo­lia, this pattern could be seen in the economy’s trade struc­ture. The share of machi­nery and equip­ment in total imports from the USSR increased from just 7.9 percent in 1946 to over 55 percent in 1972.44 At the same time, the volume of proces­sed and semi-proces­sed goods expor­ted to the USSR increased drama­ti­cally, while the rela­tive share of raw mate­rial exports decreased.

Comecon’s objec­tive was to raise and equal out the level of deve­lo­p­ment of all its member states. This did not, howe­ver, entail repli­ca­ting the econo­mic struc­tures of the more indus­tria­li­zed states in the less deve­lo­ped states. Instead, struc­tures were to be deve­lo­ped that corre­spon­ded to the natio­nal condi­ti­ons in each state. In this way, “socia­list econo­mic inte­gra­tion” would increase produc­ti­vity and per capita income across the board, with each member specia­li­zing in a parti­cu­lar sector. As an “agro-indus­tria­li­sed state”, Mongo­lia was to be assis­ted in elec­tri­fi­ca­tion and the proces­sing of food and animal by-products (wool, leather, skins, etc.). Long-term credits and joint ventures helped to cons­truct enti­rely new proces­sing facto­ries. By the end of its first decade in Come­con, the People’s Repu­blic was alre­ady cove­ring 20 percent of the socia­list bloc’s meat imports and 10 percent of its wool imports.45 Plan­ned econo­mic inte­gra­tion with the socia­list bloc was helping to drive Mongolia’s tran­si­tion from an agra­rian coun­try to an indus­tria­li­zed state:

Source: P. Suka­che­vin et al. (1991)

The trans­fer of know­ledge and tech­no­logy was at the centre of the socia­list states’ rela­ti­ons with Mongo­lia. By 1973, some 17,000 Mongo­li­ans had recei­ved trai­ning in the USSR, with thou­sands more study­ing in other socia­list states. While Come­con still repre­sen­ted a rudi­men­tary form of inter­na­tio­nal divi­sion of labour by the 1980s, it played a key role in faci­li­ta­ting Mongolia’s deve­lo­p­ment. The coun­try saw a remar­kable pace of indus­tria­liza­tion during this period, with gross indus­trial output rising almost six-fold between 1960 and 1980.46 The Sino-Soviet split that erupted in the early 1960s was undoub­tedly detri­men­tal to Mongolia’s economy. Poli­ti­cal rela­ti­ons between Ulaan­baa­tar and Beijing became extre­mely tense, and Mongo­lia lost a vital trading part­ner directly on its border. The Trans-Mongo­lian Rail­way had linked Beijing to the USSR and would have greatly contri­bu­ted to Comecon’s potential.

Hundreds of new facto­ries were cons­truc­ted with the assis­tance of other socia­list states. The carpet factory “Wilhelm Pieck” in Ulaan­baa­tar was a joint Mongo­lia-DDR project. 

Being free from depen­dency on the capi­ta­list world market, Mongolia’s plan­ned economy did not suffer from reces­si­ons or stagna­tion and was able to grow conti­nuously, despite the oil crises affec­ting much of the rest of the world. After the impo­si­tion of capi­ta­lism in 1990, Mongo­lia was largely deindus­tria­li­zed and has been repea­tedly stri­cken by the boom bust cycle. As Dendev Terbish­dagva, the former deputy prime minis­ter of Mongo­lia (2012–2014), recalled:

“We simply copied capi­ta­lism [from the West]. We did not consider the natio­nal condi­ti­ons in Mongo­lia: the histo­ri­cal deve­lo­p­ment of our coun­try, the noma­dic sector in our economy, how many inha­bi­tants we have, and so on. We simply repli­ca­ted [the West]. […] Enter­pri­ses were priva­ti­zed. That was in my view the first major mistake. Many Mongo­li­ans lost their jobs. Highly skil­led and trai­ned indi­vi­du­als landed on the streets. The indus­tries were destroyed. Some people mana­ged to buy busi­nesses and take them abroad and ther­eby became very rich. Others lost ever­y­thing. There was suddenly a huge inequa­lity in Mongo­lia. […] Agri­cul­tu­ral was also ruined. Prior to 1990, we were export­ing wheat. By 2000, we had to import 85 percent of our wheat from Japan and the USA. Within the space of 10 years, we ruined ever­y­thing. This is what happened after we listened to the World Bank advi­sors that came to Mongo­lia. They had never been to our coun­try. They knew nothing about the struc­ture of socia­list society and the noma­dic economy. It was the same in Africa and Latin America. They told us that ever­y­thing we built had to be ruined, and in the end, they ruined it very well.”47

Mongolia and the strategy of “non-capitalist development” in Africa and Asia

The Mongo­lian government’s announce­ment in 1960 that the coun­try had comple­ted the non-capi­ta­list path of deve­lo­p­ment coin­ci­ded with the “Year of Africa”, when 17 Afri­can states secu­red their poli­ti­cal inde­pen­dence. When sear­ching for ways out of the malde­ve­lo­p­ment impo­sed by colo­nia­lism, many of these young govern­ments were inte­res­ted to learn from the indus­tria­liza­tion stra­te­gies of the Soviet Union and other socia­list states. The start­ing condi­ti­ons now confron­ting anti-impe­ria­list govern­ments in Africa and Asia were simi­lar to those confron­ting the MPRP in 1921: foreign occu­pa­tion had greatly distor­ted the struc­ture of the economy, while (semi-)feudal forces stood in the way of indus­try and social progress. In 1960, the commu­nist world move­ment elabo­ra­ted on the theo­re­ti­cal frame­work of non-capi­ta­list deve­lo­p­ment (NCD) and advan­ced the posi­tion that this path towards socia­lism was now open to new anti-impe­ria­list states such as Egypt, Mali, Guinea, and Ghana.48

The ques­tion thus arose as to how the Mongo­lian expe­ri­ence could inform non-capi­ta­list stra­te­gies in Africa and Asia. There were initi­ally two diver­gent lines in socia­list scho­lar­ship: those who argued Mongolia’s expe­ri­ence repre­sen­ted a “basic model” that all states pursuing this stra­tegy should follow or whose who belie­ved these expe­ri­en­ces had no rele­vance for the newly libe­ra­ted states.49 By the end of the 1960s, a more nuan­ced analy­sis had been sett­led on, which empha­sised that while there were gene­ral charac­te­ristics of NCD, the speci­fic poli­cies and pace of this process would differ in each state accor­ding to the natio­nal condi­ti­ons. Indeed, mecha­ni­cally copy­ing poli­cies would lead to the same mista­kes the MPRP made in the late 1920s.

Against this back­ground, scho­lars and poli­ti­cal cadres from seven socia­list states conve­ned in Berlin in 1975 for a confe­rence entit­led “The Revo­lu­tio­nary Path of the Mongo­lian People’s Repu­blic to Socia­lism: Problems of Circum­ven­ting the Capi­ta­list stage of Deve­lo­p­ment”. It was jointly hosted by Berlin’s Humboldt Univer­sity, Leipzig’s Karl Marx Univer­sity, and the DDR’s Central Coun­cil for Asian, Afri­can, and Latin Ameri­can Scien­ces, with parti­ci­pants coming from the Soviet Union, the Mongo­lian PR, the PR Bulga­ria, the DR Viet­nam, the PR Poland, and the ČSSR. Their objec­tive was to draw out the lessons from this history and under­stand how the Mongo­lian revo­lu­tio­na­ries over­came the speci­fic chal­lenges they faced.

The lectures of the confe­rence were published by the DDR’s Akade­mie Verlag. This is the list of parti­ci­pa­ting scholars.

The parti­ci­pants agreed that the gene­ral charac­ter of the Mongo­lian revo­lu­tion was the same as the revo­lu­ti­ons unfol­ding in many Afri­can and Asian states: natio­nal and demo­cra­tic, anti-impe­ria­list and anti-feudal. In demo­cra­tiz­ing society and the economy, these states would have to cont­end with the bitter resis­tance of reac­tion­ary forces (like Lamaism in Mongo­lia) and exter­nal thre­ats. To circum­vent or break off capi­ta­list rela­ti­ons, the revo­lu­tio­nary poli­ti­cal parties would have to secure state power and gradu­ally draw the working masses into the manage­ment of society. For B. Siren­dyb, profes­sor and presi­dent of Mongolia’s Academy of Scien­ces, there were four major factors that contri­bu­ted to his country’s success:

  1. The poli­ti­cal support of the commu­nist world move­ment and the econo­mic and mili­tary assis­tance of the socia­list states
  2. The poli­ti­cal leader­ship of the MPRP
  3. The people’s demo­cra­tic state power
  4. The invol­vement of the popu­lar masses in solving social and econo­mic problems

The subjec­tive factor was key here. NCD would not deve­lop spon­ta­neously as capi­ta­list rela­ti­ons did out of feuda­lism. This compli­ca­ted path to socia­lism requi­red the leader­ship of a party with a scien­ti­fi­cally groun­ded programme. In the context of colo­nial occu­pa­tion and feudal explo­ita­tion, this party would not directly emerge as a vanguard of the prole­ta­riat, as the commu­nist parties opera­ting in Europe had. Instead, the party would evolve over time, from a mass anti-colo­nial party towards a vanguard of the working people. When the Mongo­lian Peop­le’s Party had been foun­ded in 1920, its member­ship consis­ted of Arats, clerics, and nobles. Only after an intense struggle was the Marxist-Leni­nist inspi­red Arat faction able to secure victory. Over the course of further strug­gles in the follo­wing deca­des, the party and state power contin­ued to evolve, progres­si­vely taking on a prole­ta­rian charac­ter. In this vein, D. Sodnom­gombo from Mongolia’s Insti­tute of History remarked:

“In connec­tion with the funda­men­tal chan­ges in class rela­ti­ons, not only the nature but also the func­tion of the poli­ti­cal super­s­truc­ture chan­ged. Proof of this is the fact that the revo­lu­tio­nary-demo­cra­tic dicta­tor­ship of the labou­ring Arats was trans­for­med into the dicta­tor­ship of the working class, and the form­erly revo­lu­tio­nary-demo­cra­tic peop­le’s party was trans­for­med into a party of the Marxist-Leni­nist type.”50

These reflec­tions led DDR scho­lar Chris­tian Mähr­del to conclude that – on a very gene­ral level – the Africa’s anti-impe­ria­list govern­ments of the 1960s were in a simi­lar state to the MPRP in the 1920s and 1930s.51 Yet the condi­ti­ons confron­ting these govern­ments were far more complex than those confron­ting the MPRP. The socia­list-orien­ted states in Africa and Asia often belon­ged to what the UN called the “least deve­lo­ped count­ries” (LDC). They were inte­gra­ted into the capi­ta­list world economy to a far grea­ter degree than Mongo­lia had been in the 1920s. Their trade and their main econo­mic sectors were domi­na­ted by Euro­pean or US-Ameri­can corpo­ra­ti­ons. At the same time, the Afri­can states were geogra­phi­cally isola­ted from the socia­list bloc. The influence of the impe­ria­list powers was thus far grea­ter. Although the atten­dees of the confe­rence did not discuss this point, it is also important to note that the Comin­tern – which had played such an important role in guiding the MPRP – was never recon­sti­tu­ted after its disso­lu­tion in 1943.

The USSR’s econo­mic and mili­tary assis­tance for the Mongo­lian People’s Repu­blic had been pivo­tal. The Trans-Mongo­lian Rail­way repre­sen­ted a direct econo­mic line to the socia­list bloc. The anti-impe­ria­list Afri­can states did not have this privi­lege. They were encir­cled by hostile states pursuing a diffe­rent path of deve­lo­p­ment. Come­con member­ship, which helped propel Mongolia’s deve­lo­p­ment after 1960, was never gran­ted to the socia­list-orien­ted states in Africa. The most promi­sing candi­date had been Mozam­bi­que. When Maputo applied to join the orga­niza­tion in 1980, it enjoyed ardent support from Berlin because the German Demo­cra­tic Repu­blic had been working hard to estab­lish closer econo­mic ties.52 80 percent of Mozambique’s exports were still desti­ned for the capi­ta­list world market at the end of the 1970s, so this was a prime oppor­tu­nity to reduce the country’s neoco­lo­nial depen­dency on the West. Yet the other Eastern Euro­pean states in Come­con voted against admis­sion. This was likely because the other states were less deve­lo­ped than the DDR and were alre­ady strugg­ling with their own econo­mic diffi­cul­ties at the time. Mozam­bi­que was left with little choice but to turn to the West: it joined the Inter­na­tio­nal Mone­tary Fund in 1984 and opened rela­ti­ons with West Germany, thus deepe­ning its depen­dency even further.

When the commu­nist world move­ment had first formu­la­ted the possi­bi­lity of NCD in 1920, Lenin empha­si­zed this would require “the Soviet govern­ments come to [the former colo­nies’] aid with all the means at their dispo­sal”.53 This was the crux of the issue. The socia­list bloc was unable – and, to a certain extent, unwil­ling – to live up to this duty. Many scho­lars at the 1975 confe­rence repea­tedly empha­si­zed the role of the Soviet Union’s assis­tance in Mongolia’s deve­lo­p­ment, but only a few were willing to admit the limi­ta­ti­ons of their own world system:

“Even if the power and influence of the socia­list commu­nity of states is constantly incre­asing in our time, the all-round influence that could be achie­ved in concrete terms at that time [in Mongo­lia] is not yet achie­va­ble today (and for a longer period of time) in rela­tion to the socia­list-orien­ted forces in Africa and Asia, and the disen­tan­gle­ment of these count­ries from the system of the capi­ta­list world economy cannot be achie­ved so swiftly.“54

Rather than addres­sing this dilemma head on, a growing tendency within the commu­nist world move­ment sought to capi­tu­late before it and aban­don the commit­ment to the anti-impe­ria­list struggle in Africa and Asia. This could also be seen in the stagna­tion of the Comecon’s plans for inter­na­tio­nal econo­mic inte­gra­tion. Many socia­list states in Eastern Europe incre­asingly inte­gra­ted them­sel­ves into the capi­ta­list world economy by the late 1970s and 1980s. Left uncor­rec­ted, the poli­ti­cal conse­quen­ces of this dyna­mic culmi­na­ted in the so-called “new thin­king” poli­cies under Mikhail Gorba­chev. Under the guise of “prag­ma­tism”, Soviet scho­lars and diplo­mats such a Karen Brutents and Alek­sandr Yako­v­lev spear­hea­ded an effort to reduce Soviet support for socia­list-orien­ted states such as Angola, Mozam­bi­que, and Afghanistan.

Footnotes

[1] W. König, “Mongo­lei”, Museum für Völker­kunde zu Leip­zig, Leip­zig, 1967, pg. 75.

[2] Of the 225 members in Decem­ber 1921, roughly 10 percent belon­ged to the feudal clas­ses. The rest were Arats. The trial period for the nobi­lity and lamas was twice as long as it was for Arats. See R. Bormann “Zur Entste­hung un Entwick­lung der MRVP in den Jahren von 1918 bis 1940” in Die Mongo­li­sche Volks­re­pu­blik, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1982, pg. 46.

[3] V.I. Lenin, “Talk with a Dele­ga­tion of the Mongo­lian People’s Repu­blic” in Lenin Coll­ec­ted Works, Progress Publishers, 1971, Moscow. Also available: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1921/nov/05b.htm

[4] D. Das, „Die führende Rolle der MRVP während der nicht­ka­pi­ta­lis­ti­schen Entwick­lung der MVR“ in Der revo­lu­tio­näre Weg der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik zum Sozia­lis­mus, Akade­mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1978, pg. 59.

[5] R. Bormann, pg. 49.

[6] P. Suka­che­vin et al., “The Mongo­lian Peop­le’s Repu­blic: Toward a Market Economy”, Inter­na­tio­nal Mone­tary Fund, 1991, pg. 4.

[7] P. Suka­che­vin et al., pg. 5.

[8] J. Sima, „Zur Rolle der Komin­tern bei der Vertei­di­gung der Gene­ral­li­nie der MRVP Ende der zwan­zi­ger und Anfang der drei­ßi­ger Jahre“ in Der revo­lu­tio­näre Weg der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik zum Sozia­lis­mus, Akade­mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1978, pg. 241.

[9] U. Schöne, “Die Entwick­lung des Volks­bil­dungs­we­sen in der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik” in Die Mongo­li­sche Volks­re­pu­blik, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, pg. 171.

[10] J. Sima, pg. 243.

[11] Ibid., pg. 243.

[12] Ibid., pg.245.

[13] Ibid., pg. 248.

[14] Cited in H. Piazza, “Die Komin­tern und die MRVP” in Der revo­lu­tio­näre Weg der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik zum Sozia­lis­mus, Akade­mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1978, pg. 272.

[15] J. Sima, pg. 248.

[16] S. Naca­gdorz, „Das inter­na­tio­na­lis­ti­sche Bünd­nis der werk­tä­ti­gen Araten mit der Arbei­ter­klasse des sieg­rei­chen Sozia­lis­mus – ein entschei­den­der Faktor der nicht­ka­pi­ta­lis­ti­schen Entwick­lung der MVR“ in Der revo­lu­tio­näre Weg der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik zum Sozia­lis­mus, Akade­mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1978, pg. 35.

[17] J. Sima, pg. 241.

[18] W. König, pg. 85.

[19] J. Sima, pg. 257.

[20] Ibid., pg. 257.

[21] Ibid., pg. 260

[22] W. König, pg. 81.

[23] B. Siren­dyb, „Einige Probleme aus der Geschichte der nicht­ka­pi­ta­lis­ti­schen Entwick­lung der MVR zum Sozia­lis­mus“ in Der revo­lu­tio­näre Weg der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik zum Sozia­lis­mus, Akade­mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1978, pg. 25.

[24] J. Sima, pg. 241.

[25] R. Bormann, pg. 53.

[26] W. König, pg. 86.

[27] D. Sodnom­gombo, „Die grund­le­gen­den Verän­de­run­gen in der Klas­sen­struk­tur der MVR als Ergeb­nis der Über­win­dung der sozia­len Wider­sprü­che in der Über­gangs­pe­ri­ode von Feuda­lis­mus zum Sozia­lis­mus“ in Der revo­lu­tio­näre Weg der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik zum Sozia­lis­mus, Akade­mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1978, pg. 101.

[28] P. Suka­che­vin et al., pg. 6.

[29] P. Suka­che­vin et al., pg. 6 and D. Sodnom­gombo, pg. 106.

[30] H. Siebeck „Die MVRP – die führende Kraft der sozia­lis­ti­schen Revo­lu­tion in der MVR (1940 bis zur Gegen­wart)“ in Die Mongo­li­sche Volks­re­pu­blik, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1982, pg. 56.

[31] D. Sodnom­gombo, pg. 106.

[32] P. Suka­che­vin et al., pg. 6.

[33] D. Sodnom­gombo, pg. 107.

[34] Ibid., pg. 108.

[35] S. K. Roscin, “Der Lenin­sche Genos­sen­schafts­plan und die Erfah­run­gen der MVR” in Der revo­lu­tio­näre Weg der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik zum Sozia­lis­mus, Akade­mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1978, pg. 313.

[36] S. K. Roscin, “Die sozia­lis­ti­sche Land­wirt­schaft in der MVR“ in Die Mongo­li­sche Volks­re­pu­blik, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1982, pg. 96, and P. Suka­che­vin et al., pg. 6.

[37] The remai­ning cattle was owned by state farms. “Indi­vi­dual [coope­ra­tive] members were permit­ted to own live­stock. In moun­tain steppe pasture areas, ten head of live­stock per person, up to fifty head per house­hold, were allo­wed. In desert regi­ons, fifteen head per person, up to seventy-five head per house­hold, were permit­ted. Private plots also were allo­wed for [cooper­tive] farmers.” S. K. Roscin, “Die sozia­lis­ti­sche Land­wirt­schaft in der MVR“, pg.96, and R. Worden and A. M. Savada, “Mongo­lia: A Coun­try Study”, GPO for the Library of Congress, Washing­ton, 1989: https://countrystudies.us/mongolia/53.htm

[38] D. Sodnom­gombo, pg.104.

[39] D. Sodnom­gombo, pg. 104, and R. Worden and A. M. Savada.

[40] W. König, pg. 32.

[41] G.S. Matveeva, „Die Schaf­fung der mate­ri­ell-tech­ni­schen Basis in der MVR“ in Der revo­lu­tio­näre Weg der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik zum Sozia­lis­mus, Akade­mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1978, pg. 71.

[42] P. Suka­che­vin et al., pg. 6.

[43] Ibid., pg. 6.

[44] V.D. Ticho­mi­rov „Einige Probleme der ökono­mi­schen Zusam­men­ar­beit der MVR mit den sozia­lis­ti­schen Staa­ten“ in Der revo­lu­tio­näre Weg der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik zum Sozia­lis­mus, Akade­mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1978, pg. 412.

[45] Ibid., pg. 413.

[46] P. Suka­che­vin et al., pg. 8.

[47] D. Terbish­dagva, in discus­sion with the IFDDR. July 2024. Ulaanbaatar.

[48] See the “Moscow Decla­ra­tion of 1960”, signed by 81 commu­nist and workers’ parties: https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/other/1960statement.htm

[49] C. Mähr­del, „Die Erfah­rung der MRVP im revo­lu­tio­nä­ren Prozess nicht­ka­pi­ta­lis­ti­scher Entwick­lung zum Sozia­lis­mus und revo­lu­tio­när-demo­kra­ti­sche Parteien der heute sozia­lis­tisch orien­tier­ten Länder Afri­kas: Bemer­kun­gen zu einem histo­ri­schen Vergleich“ in Der revo­lu­tio­näre Weg der Mongo­li­schen Volks­re­pu­blik zum Sozia­lis­mus, Akade­mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1978, pg. 459.

[50] D. Sodnom­gombo, pg. 101.

[51] C. Mähr­del, pg. 466.

[52] The GDR accoun­ted for just over 8 percent of Mozambique’s exports and 5.5 percent of its imports in 1980. See P. Vanne­mann, “Soviet stra­tegy in Southern Africa: Gorba­che­v’s prag­ma­tic approach”, Hoover Press, Stan­ford, 1980.

[53] V.I. Lenin, “Second Congress of the Commu­nist Inter­na­tio­nal”. Available: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/jul/x03.htm

[54] C. Mähr­del, pg. 460.

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