The economic problems and achievements of the anti-fascist-democratic transformation in East Germany (1945–1949)
Table of contents
Introduction
The economy of the DDR is often portrayed as grey, ossified and ineffective. This accusation is generally levelled at the planned economy. It is intended to underpin the narrative that “there is no alternative” to capitalism. The planning system of the DDR is portrayed as a dictatorship of bureaucrats in order to conceal any impression that a society can organise its economy consciously and for rational purposes. West Germany’s own actions – from sabotage and embargo to separatism and revanchism – are either ignored or reinterpreted.
An honest examination of the DDR’s economy reveals that it defied odds and became much stronger than the initial conditions would have suggested. This would not have been possible without the active participation of citizens setting out to build a new society with awareness and initiative. They had to overcome numerous problems posed by the historical situation, the structure of the economy, and international pressure.
The aim of this article is to better understand these conditions and challenges and to uncover how the party, trade unions, and broader masses dealt with them. Many discussions around the questions of market and plan, the law of value and profit (which unfolded later in the 1950s and 1960s) seem to me to be more comprehensible when the concrete problems and conditions are analysed. The central prerequisite for the construction of the new society was that the working class held state power. But this power had to be maintained in alliance — with the peasants and with anti-fascist forces. And concrete work was required to mobilise the masses. This was the most difficult task. The help and support of the Soviet Union when dealing with political issues and material needs was also of existential importance.
This text will roughly outline the conditions of the economy of the Soviet Occupation Zone (SOZ): What starting conditions and tasks shaped its development? The second aspect to be examined is the role of workers’ initiative and the establishment of democratic state structures in implementing this process, as well as the hurdles the labour movement had to overcome. The conditions of the international conflict and the pressure under which the anti-fascist-democratic transformation took place will also be mentioned.
The period from 1945 to 1949 is characterised by a special dynamic that can be understood as a transition. After the Second World War, a new situation emerged, the exact form of which was not clear from the outset. It is interesting to note that even in this early and complicated phase, strong forms of the organised labour movement developed, which proved capable of taking control of the situation. At the same time, the structural problems of the economy that the DDR would later have to wrestle with became apparent.
Starting conditions in Eastern Germany
In order to understand the development of the economy and society in the SOZ and the DDR, it is necessary to consider the initial conditions. At the end of the war, industry in the territory of what would later become the DDR was characterised by the fascist war and armaments economy. Overall, it was a developed industry with branches that were relevant for technical progress, albeit with varying degrees of mechanisation and relatively low productivity compared to other capitalist economies. The working class was very well educated and already had a lot of experience in industrial work processes. In eastern Germany, there were regions with larger companies (Saxony-Anhalt) and regions with many small and medium-sized companies (Thuringia, Saxony); there were hardly any corporate headquarters.[1] Compared to the Eastern European countries that had followed the people’s democratic path and the development of socialism, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, or Hungary, the proportion of industry in the SOZ was significantly higher. Only Czechoslovakia had a similarly high level of industrialisation in the Soviet-aligned camp.[2]
The historically developed industrial structure in Germany consisted of relatively closed regions with interwoven branches of industry and locations where specialised production was concentrated. The economy on the territory of the SOZ had no heavy industry (i.e., iron and steel production, smelting of ores and processing of metals). Most of these were located in the Ruhr area in western Germany. Light industry (i.e., consumer goods production, including textiles and chemical production) predominated in the SOZ. This meant that there was no structure for processing raw materials and producing basic materials for the construction of machines — and therefore no basis for an industrial production circuit. There were also only small deposits of coal, the main source of energy at the time. Most deposits were located in the West. In 1933, 15.8 million tonnes of coal were consumed in the area of the SOZ, but only 3 million tonnes were mined there. The annual output of the three coalfields in Saxony was produced by the plants in the West German Ruhr area in just one month. All West German coalfields together produced over 158 million tonnes of coal in 1936.[3] Although increasing the output of the Saxon coalfields was an important task, the larger lignite (“brown coal”) deposits also had to be exploited. Lignite was a less efficient source of energy, and its use was particularly harmful to health and the environment.
This meant that the SOZ economy did not have a closed reproduction process and was dependent on supplies from the West and was not able to survive independently in this form. Occupying only 30.4% of Germany’s post-war territory and with a share of 17.9% of Germany’s industrial production in 1936, the SOZ was thus below the industrialisation level of the western zones.[4] The West’s separatist policy and sanctions hit the East hard, as can be seen from the trade in goods: in 1936, 79% of all deliveries from the eastern German territories went to western Germany, while only 21% went abroad. As much as 86% of imports came from the western parts of the country and only 14% from abroad.[5] To make matters worse, these shortcomings could not be compensated for by the increase in foreign trade, as trade with the then socialist countries was only 16.1% for imports and 15.8% for exports.[6]
In addition, the destruction in the east was significantly greater because the Wehrmacht had fought fiercely until the end to prevent the Red Army from gaining ground, while in the west there were more frequent surrenders without a fight. In addition, some machines and plants were relocated to the west by private companies before the end of the war. Industrial production was 10–15% of its pre-war level.[8] Germany was to pay 10 billion dollars in reparations to the Soviet Union — a small sum in view of the 485 billion dollars in war damage. However, the majority was paid by the SOZ, even though it was the smaller area. The West had stopped paying reparations in 1946 for political reasons. Dismantling factories as a form of reparation quickly proved to be of little use, as the factories often could not be easily rebuilt in the USSR. The last dismantling took place in 1947.
“The economic situation in autumn 1945 was extremely difficult. Even in the last summer months, industrial production was still at rock bottom. The destruction of many factories, the beginning of dismantling, the shortage of raw materials and semi-finished products, the chaos in the interrelationships between the factories, the complete standstill in transport, the sudden departure of hundreds of thousands of ‘foreign labourers’ that Hitler’s Germany had taken from other countries (and a large proportion of the workers were still prisoners of war) — all this made solving the necessary tasks appear extremely difficult, if not impossible. In general, lethargy and apathy prevailed. Many workers did not believe that things could move forward again. The first task was therefore to get the economy up and running. It was important to encourage people so that they would start working again.”
Overall, the starting conditions were significantly worse than in the West. The area was home to 18 out of 65 million inhabitants in Germany. The 4.4 million workers (1946) made up 60% of the labour force. In addition, there were 1 million salaried employees.[9] The Soviet Union and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), which was formed by a merger of communists and social democrats in April 1946, set the objective of a unified, neutral, and democratic Germany, not yet a socialist Germany. This policy was pursued honestly and transparently and was expressed in numerous proposals for resolving the “German question” after the war.[10] The West, on the other hand, focused on asserting its interests and used the western occupation zones and later the separatist state of West Germany as a frontline state against the socialist camp. The West’s policy of division quickly led to economic ties being severed. Industry in the SOZ represented the torso of a historically grown, highly internationally interlinked national industry.[11]
Reconstruction
Initially, the war damage had to be repaired, production had to be restarted, and economic life had to be normalised.[12] The production orders of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD), which defined a production programme and adopted a short-term plan for the fourth quarter of 1945, served this purpose. Reserves of raw materials had to be recorded and brought to processing plants; labour also had to be recorded and deployed.
This binding treaty, which was signed by the four Allied powers (USSR, USA, UK, and France), stipulated that Germany should be demilitarised, denazified, decentralized, and democratised in order to prevent it from starting another war.
The economic principles of the Potsdam Agreement set out what economic level Germany should have in the future. The basic statement was that the average standard of living in Germany should not exceed that of other European countries. To this end, it was determined that the German people would have to be left with sufficient resources after the payment of reparations to enable them to exist without external assistance. Production capacities that could be considered dispensable in industry were therefore either to be withdrawn or destroyed. The economic principles were concretised in March 1946 in a Reparations and Industrial Plan (generally referred to in the literature as the Industrial Plan), which the victorious powers had agreed on. The industrial plan specified the industrial objects to be dismantled and the approximate production volume of German industry and its individual branches.
From Mühlfriedel: “SAG-Betriebe – Schulen des Sozialismus”
The reconstruction of the economy was also closely linked to the elimination of the economic roots of fascism and war. This task was therefore only possible through the efforts of activists, through an anti-fascist-democratic movement. The SMAD promoted this movement and allowed democratic parties and organisations and transferred state powers to emerging democratic state bodies, including the German Central Administration for Fuel, Industry, Trade and Supply.
The revitalisation succeeded quickly. The greatest successes were achieved in the energy and fuel industries, power plants were made operational and networks were restored. According to one estimate, industrial production in the first few months after the liberation from fascism was 10 to 20 per cent of the 1936 level and 25 per cent by the end of 1945.[13]
The disempowerment of the corporations
The Potsdam Agreement stipulated the denazification and decentralization as well as the de-monopolization of German industry in order to prevent Germany from becoming the starting point of another world war in the future. It was proven that the war was wanted and organised by the large corporations and that they had transferred power to the fascists. Companies from the coal and steel industry, such as Thyssen and Krupp, as well as from the chemical industry, such as the trust IG Farben, in which BASF, Bayer and Hoechst were united, had wanted to conquer and secure raw materials and sales markets abroad. The major banks, such as Deutsche Bank, played a central role in the political realisation and financing of these plans. The Potsdam Treaty, which was binding under international law, was implemented in the SOZ, while it was deliberately suspended in the western occupation zones in order to restore the power of the large monopolies and old elites.
The idea of popular or people’s control emerged parallel to workers’ control. It drew from experiences in the Weimar Republic, where, in 1923, Popular Control Committees were formed to ward off racketeers and speculators, but were quickly suppressed by the state. After 1945, people’s control became an effective instrument for combating all forms of the black market. The factory groups of the People’s Control were intended to prevent factory managers from selling part of their production on the black market. After the black market had been effectively combated, other issues took center stage, above all the identification of economic risk factors, such as, planning errors, negligence, sabotage, and a poor work ethic in production and administration. Eventually, a state system of economic control was established as the Central Control Commission was set up, into which the People’s Committees were integrated. In October 1949, there were 3,782 Committees with 26,000 members.
From Roesler: “Aufsicht und Kontrolle in den volkseigenen Betrieben”
The situation for the labour movement after the end of the war was both difficult and characterised by new beginnings. Of the 300,000 members of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in 1933, half had been persecuted by the fascist terror system, tens of thousands had been murdered and many had only been able to save themselves by fleeing. The organisations of the labour movement as a whole first had to regroup and reorient themselves.[14] A group of communists around Walter Ulbricht who had returned from exile began their political work even before the Wehrmacht capitulated and formed a broad network of anti-fascists.[15] The establishment of new trade union structures also began immediately.[16]
Industrial companies represented centres of the organised working-class movement. Here, communists and social democrats had already gained important experience in trade unions and works councils during the Weimar era (1919–1933). Many agreed that the causes of fascism and war now had to be eliminated and the working class had to be reunited. Yet, in light of the struggle between communists and social democrats, which dated back to the 1918 November Revolution, distrust continued to prevail in sections of the KPD and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Communists such as Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht and social democratic leaders such as Otto Grotewohl and Max Fechner campaigned ardently for unity of action between their parties, for they believed that only a reunited working class could successfully neutralize German militarism.[17]
The class-conscious workers, who were often organised in workplace councils and the trade unions, provided strong impetus for the revival and increase in production and for the anti-fascist-democratic upheaval in industry. They removed fascists and incriminated individuals from the factory management. Thousands of members of the corporate bureaucracy were removed. Factories were detached from corporate structures and a new management was put in place, which mostly consisted of workers. Workplace councils began to implement the right of co-determination and to establish workers’ control in significant parts of the economy.[18] Initially, committees of SPD and KPD members were formed on the basis of the KPD’s “Guidelines for the Activities of Local Popular Committees in the Economic Sphere”, which directly established workers’ committees, many of which took over the management of companies. These committees thus already took on a different character to the limited form of co-determination that was established in the capitalist Weimar era. Unified company trade union organisations were then created in 1948.[19] In line with the general strategy, the SED consistently emphasized that these new forms of workers’ control should not to be applied in an exaggerated manner. They were first and foremost to be directed against the large corporations, not small- and medium-sized businesses, which were encouraged to continue operating in the SOZ.
When the workers began to restart production in the first few months after the total defeat of Hitler’s Germany, they did so without waiting for instructions from the previous management, most of whom had fled or withdrew. Inevitably, new management structures emerged from the day-to-day tasks alongside the existing remnants of the old ones. The previous management was often placed under workers’ control. The instrument of this control was initially the spontaneously adopted form of the Betriebsrat (“workplace council”). The SED emphasized, however, that the aim was not to simply re-establish the old, limited forms of worker representation in private businesses that had emerged in the Weimar era (1919–1933).
As early as November 1945, the Economics Minister of Saxony, the most industrially developed region in eastern Germany, was able to state: “In mining, the management, directorates and supervisory boards can no longer do anything without the workplace councils and trade union organisations.”
From Roesler: “Aufsicht und Kontrolle in den volkseigenen Betrieben”
The corporations did not relinquish their power voluntarily. They were located in West Berlin, but also had illegally operating business organisations in the SOZ. They tried to use the offices of bourgeois parties in East Berlin as organisational cells. Their plan was to wage an economic war against the democratic transformation by keeping production as low as possible and slowing the pace of reconstruction. They used methods such as mismanagement, disregard of technological principles, the theft of technical documents, the theft and removal of production equipment, and the poaching of specialised personnel. They also tried to mislead the labourers by demagogically blaming the difficulties on the government and not on the post-war material conditions. New capitalists’ associations were also founded, including the Reichsindustriegruppe.[20]
The corporations exercised their economic power primarily through the banks and thus the control of the economy’s financial resources. The decision of the Soviet city commander in July 1945 to ban the activities of all capitalist financial institutions and banks and to close the major banks and insurance companies was therefore an important measure for implementing the Potsdam Agreement. All credit operations were prohibited, and bank deposits were initially frozen. This was also intended to prevent war profiteers from cashing their cheques. In addition, all Reich associations, Reich societies and the Reich Chamber of Entrepreneurs were prohibited.[21]
“It would be an illusion to believe that the unification of the two working-class parties [KPD and SPD] was straightforward, simple, and problem-free. The opposite was the case. And it could not have been otherwise. Although almost everyone involved had the best will, every comrade and the entire party had to undergo a profound process of reflection. This did not happen solely and primarily through discussions, but above all through joint efforts to solve the practical challenges during the revolutionary transformation process. I remember that in Elbingerode, during an ideological discussion, the speaker, a former social democratic comrade, said: “Well, we have familiarised ourselves with Marxism, but please keep Leninism to yourselves.” And for that he received spontaneous applause from the comrades from the former SPD. The same comrades, however, spared neither energy, time nor effort to actively solve the revolutionary tasks and act in the spirit of Leninism.”
This process of upheaval was also initiated by the workers themselves. Motivated by the party leadership of the KPD, many of the workers who had rebuilt their factories themselves declared that their companies should be detached from corporate structures and administered by the public authorities. The state governments, which were now run by anti-fascists, confiscated the property of war and Nazi criminals. In Thuringia, the state president ordered the confiscation of the Eisenach plant belonging to Bayrische-Motoren-Werke AG on 7 September 1945. In Saxony, the Flick corporation was not only confiscated but also expropriated without compensation following demands by the workers.
The Sequester Commissions
In autumn 1945, it became clear that the Western Allies would not implement any measures against the excessive concentration of the German economy; all negotiations in the Allied Control Council on concrete measures against economic concentration ended inconclusively due to obstruction by the Western Allies.[22] At the same time, corporate headquarters stepped up their sabotage activities.
The immediate task in SOZ was not aimed at the expropriation of all capitalist companies, but only those whose owners were war and Nazi criminals. It was necessary to inspect each company and decide whether expropriation was justified. This was only possible with the active cooperation of workers and employees. The SMAD issued Order 124, which ordered the confiscation of the assets of the German state, the heads of the NSDAP offices, leading members of the party, the military authorities, and the banned societies, clubs, etc. This also included abandoned companies whose leaders had often fled to the West.
The SMAD transferred the implementation of these orders to the democratic state organs. They considered how the largest possible sections of society could be involved and consequently set up commissions consisting of administrative staff, representatives of the political parties, democratic mass organisations and unions, and workers from the factories. These Sequester Commissions were tasked with examining which properties should be placed under sequestration (i.e., safekeeping) due to the role their owners had played during the fascist era.[23] This meant that they were to remain under state custody until the examination was completed and a decision on expropriation was reached.
The workers of the companies under investigation were empowered to examine their management’s business records, interview employees, and give the accused businessmen the opportunity to defend themselves. After this thorough examination, the members of the Commissions usually came to a joint decision on whether or not the owner should be deprived of his property.[24] The work of the Commissions provided workers with insights into the inner connection between capitalism and fascism and militarism, while also offering an overview of company assets.
The Commissions ultimately proposed that the SMAD confiscate 19,932 properties, 43 per cent of which were in Thuringia, 21 per cent in Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt respectively, 10 per cent in Brandenburg and 5 per cent in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. Of the properties under sequestration, 34 per cent were then expropriated by the SMAD, while 66 per cent were returned to their private owners. The owners of the returned businesses had not proven to be war and Nazi criminals, or their production facilities had only minor importance. Companies whose future the USSR government reserved the right to decide on were recorded on a separate list.[25]
The assets of expropriated companies were transferred to the German administrations. The SMAD thus entrusted the expropriation and redistribution of Nazi war criminals’ assets in the hands of the anti-fascist-democratic forces — in contrast to the Western powers.[26] The SMAD also ordered that 202 of the sequestered factories should not be dismantled to pay reparations, as originally planned. Instead, these factories were to stay in Germany and be converted into Soviet property so that their production could pay the reparations. This gave rise to the so-called Soviet Joint-Stock Companies (SAGs), which later played an important role in the creation of public property and the planning of the economy.
Model Saxony
The state of Saxony was the industrial heartland of the SOZ, although small and medium-sized companies predominated. The Authorities for Company Reorganisation were the nuclei of the future organisation of the economy. They ensured better utilisation of capacities and raw materials and organised the distribution of machines across companies. They intervened in the existing organisational structure of the companies to increase production and make production more effective, while sometimes merging previously independent companies.[27]
These efforts also involved the active participation and initiative of the workers. In Saxony, the workers demanded that all factors in the coal sector should be brought together under uniform management, regardless of their form of ownership. The Sächsische Steinkohlenwerke GmbH was created. This established the basic principle for the organisation of state-owned enterprises, which were grouped together in industrial administrations. In addition to the territorial principle, which was initially necessary — i.e. the organisation of the companies according to their geographical locations — the production principle was introduced. The organisation of companies according to branches of industry is historically the most widespread form of planned economy. The Central Committee of the SED analysed this process from the outset and attempted to generalise such progressive forms of organisation and management. The structure practised in Saxony was set out in a guideline as a model for all states in the SOZ.[28]
The referendum in Saxony
In April 1946, the KPD and SPD united to form the SED. This was a historic step that sought to rectify the division of the working-class movement, which had proven fatal in the struggle against fascism. It was also an important prerequisite for the consolidation of the new order because only a reunited and determined labour movement could defend the gains achieved during the anti-fascist-democratic transformation.
The SED tasked the Saxony state administration to hold a referendum on the law to transfer the property of war and Nazi criminals to the people. At the time, the SED had around 3,000 workplace groups and almost 2,000 neighbourhood branches. The party organisations held rallies and company meetings to inform and discuss the upcoming referendum. They succeeded in winning over broad social forces, including the church, which endorsed the vote. In June 1946, more than 2.6 million Saxons voted “Yes” to the question “Do you agree with the law to handover the companies of war and Nazi criminals to people’s property?”. That was 82.42 per cent of the valid votes and 77.62 per cent of the votes cast, with a high voter turnout of 93.71 per cent. This political success had repercussions throughout Germany. Similar decisions followed in all the states of the SOZ. In Berlin a resolution was subsequently passed by the city council to “transfer corporations and other economic enterprises into public ownership”.[29]
The road to public ownership
From a legal point of view, the companies and means of production were not yet owned by the people, but were held in trust by the state governments. A new form of ownership had to be created. The companies were often only partly owned by the state in the form of shareholdings. The right of disposal over state property lay with the state parliaments. The state constitutions did not rule out the reprivatisation of property.
In 1948, the German Economic Commission proposed completing the sequestration process and creating a zonal organisation of social ownership of the means of industrial production. This was intended to conclude the phase of scrutinising private capitalist businessmen and allow those who had not been expropriated to concentrate fully on developing their businesses. In April 1948, the SMAD declared that state, communal, and cooperative property resulting from the expropriation of war and Nazi criminals was to be treated as national property that could neither be sold nor transferred to private individuals or organisations. The legal category of “people’s property” (nationalized ownership) was now recognized alongside the property of individuals and legal entities.[30] The Volkseigener Betrieb (VEB, “people’s own company”) became a fixed legal form in the economy.
This step represented a reform of the law to keep a pace with the political work of the party and trade unions. The new form of ownership had to be linked with the activity of the workers, with their relationship to the means of production.
The beginning of the “Cold War”
The USA had already begun to change course in 1946 and refused to implement the Potsdam Agreement, as US Secretary of State Byrnes explained. In March, the British Prime Minister had already called for a British-American military alliance against the Soviet Union in his infamous “Iron Curtain Speech” in Fulton, USA.[31] It became apparent that the western zones were to be made into a separatist state. To this end, they were initially merged from three to two zones, and a joint economic council was formed between them. This move removed the western zones from Germany’s common economic area. The capitalist powers secretly began preparing a currency reform for their zones to cement this step.[32]
The currency reform, which was one-sidedly implemented in June 1948, also facilitated the pumping of billions of US dollars into West German companies through the so-called Marshall Plan. The western occupation zones were then also integrated into the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the forerunner of the OECD. The introduction of the new currency was a clear violation of the Potsdam Agreement, for it separated the economy of the Western zones from the eastern zone and thereby undermined the clause stipulating that Germany should remain “a single economic entity”.[33] At the same time, the Western powers imposed a complete blockade of the SOZ, which led to severe shortages of some goods and raw materials. The introduction of the Deutschmark in West Berlin also led to the division of the city into two economic areas and exerted strong economic pressure on the SOZ, as many goods produced in the east were “absorbed” by the stronger currency area. The aim of the capitalist states was to “roll back” socialism; the anti-fascist-democratic transformation in the SOZ was their frontline target.
The situation in 1948 had changed significantly compared to 1945. Internationally, the West’s policy of confrontation came to a head. The USA began to form a separatist state out of the western zones as a spearhead against the socialist camp. The division of Germany had not been written in stone in 1945, but it quickly became a reality by 1948. The establishment of an anti-fascist-democratic order was in line with the Potsdam Agreement. The establishment of an independent industry and economy was necessary to secure and advance this new order. The authorities in the SOZ were faced with two choice: either surrender and restore the conditions that had led to the war or strengthen the anti-fascist forces in the east, which would ultimately strengthen the position of anti-fascists in the western occupation zones too.
The SED decided on a number of measures in 1948, including the creation of a two-year plan to rebuild the economy. The party also endeavoured to train personnel who were capable of mastering the new tasks. The goal was not yet the establishment of socialism, but the safeguarding of the anti-fascist-democratic order. The SED and the USSR continued to strive for a unified, neutral Germany and undertook numerous initiatives to counter the Western attempts at division, including the People’s Congress movement, which called for a central German government and a referendum on German unity and manifested itself in three People’s Congresses with over 2,000 delegates from all occupation zones. This movement was banned in the western occupation zones.
Building up the economy was not easy and took place under permanent sabotage, embargo, and military threat from the West. The supply situation was still very poor in those years. One of the most important tasks of the state organs and companies was to increase production and supply the population with food and other important goods. In 1946, the food supply in Saxony was only 39% of the calorie consumption per capita per day compared to 1934–38, in 1947 it was 41.5% and in 1948 54.1%.[34] Nevertheless, by 1948 the economy had been successfully restarted and the chaos of the immediate post-war period had been eliminated.
The two-year plan
In 1948, the SED presented a draft of the two-year plan (2YP) for discussion and thus moved to longer-term economic planning. [35] The 2YP was later followed by 5‑year plans. In the planned economy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, perspective plans emerged as longer-term planning with a duration of five years, while annual plans were drawn up for the more concrete management of the economy. This was later supplemented by the so-called general perspective, which was used to plan overarching developments, for example in the technical field.
The 2YP of 1948 aimed to increase production and labour productivity. The focus was on the state-owned sector, which was to be expanded. There was still a significant capitalist sector at this time. In 1950, at the end of the 2YP phase, there were still 17,500 capitalist companies in industry (=74.4% of all industrial companies) with 548,000 workers and employees (24.3% of all employees), which produced 23.5% of the gross industrial product. The proportion was particularly high in light industry and food production.[36] The 2JP aimed to bring about a predominance of the state-owned sector, but also to use private initiative to increase production and restore the economy.
The capitalist companies
During these years, the SED did not focus on anti-capitalist nationalisations, but rather on using private initiative to get the economy moving again. Key sectors in the economy — energy, heavy industry, and finance — were under state control. The capitalist companies were both integrated into the control system and had limits placed on their capital utilisation. This was because the conditions for capitalist reproduction had not been abolished, which is why entrepreneurs strove for expansion and the highest possible rate of profit.
The private capitalist enterprises were smaller and less mechanised than the state-owned industry. On average, 31.2 workers and employees worked in a private capitalist enterprise and produced a gross product worth 312,432 Mark. In an average VEB, there were 486 workers who produced a gross product of 5,014,600 M. Yet the machines in use were mostly outdated.[37]
The integration and limitation of capitalist businesses did not proceed without conflict. In 1948, product range specifications were introduced in addition to the previous quantity specifications. This was intended to prevent the capitalist companies from producing poor-quality goods to meet state supply quotas (which received low prices) and then selling the better-quality goods at higher prices on the black market. There were other means by which the capitalist companies attempted to undermine the anti-fascist democratic order, including the violation of price regulations and the withholding of taxes. Businessmen were often discontent with political developments and began setting up business associations to organize themselves. Assessing these developments, the SED sought to calm fears by introducing commercial relations between state-owned and capitalist companies, which were now to be based on fixed contracts rather than simple production orders.[38]
The private capitalist companies had made a contribution to the anti-fascist-democratic development and played an important role in producing exports. In line with the aim of the 2YP, their share of gross industrial production fell from 43.7% in 1947 to 31.5% in 1949.[39]
A nationally-owned industrial circuit
A ring of craftsmen’s businesses was to be formed around the VEBs to act as suppliers or carry out repairs. Focus was first and foremost on resuscitating inactive heavy industry rather than building new factories. The aim was to create a closed economic reproduction process in the SOZ, without which there would have been stagnation, disruptions, and further disproportions in the economy. The difficulties were – there were frequent downtimes due to outdated technology and a lack of spare parts due to the Western embargo.
The enterprises of state-owned industry had to establish relationships with each other, which required the creation of a financial circuit. In addition, balance sheets were drawn up to acquire a complete overview of the industrial assets in the hands of the people. The basic procedure was as follows: the companies transferred their profits and amortisation to the German Economic Commission and received expenditure for investments from it. The state authorities had to draw up new production statistics, a price catalogue, and comparative value planning, consumption standards and wage quotas, and a consumption analysis. The Academy of Administration was founded to train specialists in economic planning.[40]
Planning committees
Planning committees and commissions were formed in order to discuss the plan as widely as possible. In 1948, there were 1111 planning commissions with 4599 members in Saxony alone. In large companies, there were planning offices with full-time members. The committees were supposed to translate the larger plans onto the company level and actively organise and direct the company’s workflow accordingly. Additional plans were to be drawn up in the factories in order to exploit raw materials, energy sources, labour and financial resources. In 1949, this approach led to the form of the so-called “counter-plan”, which was a “response” or supplement to the central plan that the companies themselves had drawn up. These counter-plans were intended to define the company’s contribution more precisely. The company planning committee became a substructure of the planning apparatus.[41]
The experiences of the Soviet Union and the role of the SAG in the SOZ played an important role in the development of planning.[42] SAG directors were experienced and trained German managers. The SAGs planned more flexibly, gave the directors more room for manoeuvre, and introduced important production controls. For example, dispatchers in the coal industry reported hourly data on the production process in mining. The reason for the higher productivity of the SAG was that experience from the Soviet Union was applied. One-man management was an important factor. With tighter leadership, which paid attention to economic issues such as rationality, saving raw materials, and increasing morale, faster and more effective decisions could be made, whereas in the initial phase of the anti-fascist-democratic order, grassroots democratic ideas prevailed in some cases and committees of three were set up to manage the companies, but these worked less effectively.[43]
Negative accumulation
In 1946, there was a sharp decline in industrial production and the transport system came to a standstill, partly due to severe frost. The supply situation deteriorated. Workers’ performance fell to between 20% and 30% of normal levels. Labour discipline declined sharply. There were several problems that needed to be solved, including the low capacity utilisation and the distorted technical composition of the production apparatus: unsuitable machines were used to manufacture products, often wasting a lot of energy and increasing wear and tear on the machines. There were also high repair costs and poor-quality work equipment. These were the consequences of the disproportions created by the war economy and the West’s separatist policy.[44]
The amount of living labour required to produce the given quantity of use values increased considerably in 1947. One factor contributing to this was the increasing deterioration in labour discipline, which was reflected in the fact that a considerable proportion of the workforce stayed away from the workplace and there was a general reluctance to work: Workers did not fully contribute their experience and skills to the labour process. Added to this was the lack of qualifications of many workers who were new to the process. The production time for a product was longer than the technologically necessary time because the poor quality forced rework.[45]
Production standards (“norms”) were developed to determine how much should be produced in a given period of time.
Naturally, an increase in productivity would lead to an increase in standards, as more could now be produced in less time. It proved difficult to communicate to the workforce that an increase in output did not lead to lower wages and redundancies, as it does in capitalism, but to a better life for everyone. Especially as long as there were still capitalist companies and as long as the effect of the improvement could not be felt immediately (as heavy industry had to be built up first), this point was difficult to get across.
Opponents of political developments in the East exploited these contradictions and tried to incite people against the government, as was shown by the instrumentalisation of the 1953 riots, which were triggered by an increase in production standards.
Productivity was too low. In 1948, the starting year of the 2YP, there was still “negative accumulation”, i.e. more was consumed than was produced or replaced and newly created. The ratio of production to consumption in 1948 was 17.2 to 18.3 billion marks. This problem had to be tackled both technically and through conscious action on the part of producers. The war damage and the lack of raw material supplies due to the blockade policy of the West required massive investments, which could only be made thanks to support and co-operation with the Soviet Union and an increase in production.[46]
The activist movement
Ultimately, the performance of the workforce had to be increased. To this end, the incentive system was expanded to include piecework wages (calculated on the basis of the quantity produced or the number of pieces per hour). One problem was the determination of labour standards (“norms”), i.e. how much was to be produced in a given time. Until then, norms had been based on categories adopted from capitalism or were based on estimates, i.e. they did not yet have a scientific and truly adequate basis. From 1948, a more systematic approach called technically based nroms (TAN) were adopted. [47]
The workers’ own initiative in the form of a “activist movement” had not yet become a mass movement, and many workers clung to their old norms. At its Second Party Congress in 1947, the SED adopted the slogan “Produce more, distribute fairly, live better!” and called for initiative to solve the economic problems of the workers. There were many problems in the coal mining industry, above all the poor technical equipment, the difficult geological conditions, and the associated working conditions, but above all the drop in morale caused in part by the high fluctuation.[48] The SMAD counteracted this by significantly improving living conditions for the miners, renewing the wage system, raising wages, extending holidays, and increasing hardship allowances. Through continuous work, the SED succeeded in politically activating more miners, which was evident in the increased voter turnout in the trade union and works council elections. At the same time, the activity of political opponents increased, sabotage became more frequent, as did thefts, which were easier due to the high turnover of workers. Recruitment increased and the mood deteriorated. In this situation, the experienced workers, who were already familiar with the hard work and had organisational experience, were central. They formed the seeds of what became the activist movement.[49]
In the first half of 1948, the SED, alongside the trade union federation (FDGB) and the youth movement (FDJ) convened numerous activist conferences and organised competitions between the factories to increase productivity. The number of activists was increased, albeit still at a low level. An important turnaround was achieved with the adoption of the draft 2YP. As a result, the longer-term purpose of work was clearer. The party organisations in the factories were able to increase their activities. The planning discussion also drew in and mobilised large sections of the workforce.[50]
The role model Adolf Hennecke
The miner Adolf Hennecke provided an important impetus for the popularity of the activist movement. He already had twenty years of professional experience, had a record of strong work ethic, and was a member of the SPD and later the SED. The most active party members had agreed to work in the most difficult places. Hennecke was appointed as a labour instructor in his company and was supposed to organise the local workforces to achieve higher performance. He guided the less experienced workers, gaining valuable managing and guidance experience himself.[51]
Hennecke observed the company’s stagnating performance. He suggested better work preparation, the application of advanced working methods and more precise use of the geological conditions, as well as more effective use of technology. In autumn 1948, he was able to exceed his company’s norms by 387 percent.[52] What enabled Hennecke’s achievement was not simply a greater physical effort, but his understanding of the entire work process and all its conditions. Through his experience as an instructor, he recognised that better work organisation, more rational utilisation of the means of production and more careful treatment of the work equipment as well as new working methods and, last but not least, the political attitude of the worker were necessary to increase productivity. Hennecke discussed the shift schedule with the plant manager and his colleagues before beginning his shift and planned all of his work steps in advance. Bringing the hoisting equipment as close as possible to the coal face in order to save shovel work, and using the hammer more effectively were key to his success and Hennecke was able to generalize these experiences for his collective. [53]
Hennecke’s motivation to increase production corresponded to the resolutions of his party, which had analysed the problem in terms of society as a whole. His shift was thus not a spontaneous individual endeavour, but part of a political movement. Hennecke applied the general findings to the specific work steps.[54] The story was publicised on the radio and in the press. The SED, FDGB and FDJ discussed it in the factories and many workplace groups took initiatives to follow in Hennecke’s footsteps. This was initially met with resistance in many companies. Some workers considered Hennecke a norm-breaker, a label that was incited through a smear campaign by the western broadcasters.
With the formation of people’s property, the objective conditions were created for a new attitude to work and for new relationships between the workers. Increasing production now benefitted both the individual and the whole society. This notion was promoted by the trade union movement and through activist conferences, which were important spaces to exchange experiences.[55] The movement spread from Hennecke’s plant on to the other coalfields. Younger workers, who brought more vigour and stauncher opposition to the fascist militarists, played a decisive role in spreading the movement.[56]
Individual material incentives also accompanied the activist movement. Benefits in kind or vouchers for purchases in the state-owned retail trade were handed out as rewards. For many miners, this was a way to improve their individual living conditions. Over time, the realisation that life could only be improved through increased productivity became grounded.
The increase in output was an important step forward. However, exceeding norms led to an increase in wages without productivity rising to the same extent. The most politically aware workers, most of whom were organised in the party and trade union, thus began to raise their norms voluntarily. This meant that they worked more in the same amount of time — without their wages rising. This step expressed the necessary consciousness that made a new relationship to labour possible.[57]
At a conference of activists from the coal mines at the end of June 1949 of the Zwickau-Oelsnitz mining district, the miner Alfred Baumann explained that he had raised the norm to which he had previously worked on his own initiative. He called on other activists to follow suit. Since the summer months of 1949, this practice spread to various other industries. Many workers concluded contracts with the management which set out the conditions for the voluntary norms increase.[58]
Quality and competition
Many forms of mass initiative were adopted from the Soviet Union, where they had already been successfully practised. The poor quality of the products led to necessary repairs and unsaleable faulty products. This was a particular problem for exports. Compliance with technical regulations was key to improving the quality of the products. Experienced workers helped those who did not yet have the same skills. The factories also began to act as collectives. They held weekly production consultations and in-house competitions and formed quality brigades modelled on those in the Soviet Union, which were made up of the best workers, the factory manager, and the factory trade union leadership and which inspected and monitored production. They helped the workers with difficulties, drew up work regulations and set limits for quality grades.[59]
“I racked my brains as to how I could contribute to improving quality with my own resources. An article from a brochure on working methods from the Soviet Union attracted my interest. It discussed how to improve quality in textile production. Our plant manager called for the formation of a quality brigade at some point. We decided that all members would instruct their colleagues from their workplace and discuss errors with them. We were thus able to improve quality.
But it was a tough battle. My presentations at meetings were often criticised and some people were provocative. But I did not allow myself to be intimidated. Some also took offence at the fact that I was a woman talking about improving the work. The women usually reacted much more positively, were more approachable and very thirsty for knowledge. It was a time in which the fight for equal rights for women occurred not in theory, not on paper, but in the factories, in day-to-day practical work.”
From Luise Ermisch in “Die ersten Jahre”, pg. 134 ff.
1948 also saw the emergence of the “competition movement”. It organised the competition for better production results between the workforces of different companies and between members of the workforce. They became a regular part of company life. The decisive factor was that the workers and engineers consciously designed the work process and improved the workplace organisation themselves. This was linked to the fact that more workers were able to penetrate the operational and social conditions and thus organise the use of materials and energy consumption more efficiently. The aim was to increase capacity utilisation and improve quality and profitability. [60]
The establishment of a new culture of joint labour played a major role in all forms of mass initiative. Collectivity, mutual help, and comradeship were prerequisites for the development of the workers’ creativity. The confrontation with individualism, egoism, and ignorance had to be conducted without rejecting the pursuit of a better standard of living.
The activist and competitive movements led to an increase in per capita productivity — in mechanical engineering by 45% and in textiles and leather goods by 88%. Overall productivity increased gradually from autumn 1947, rose more strongly in 1949 and reached 85% of the 1936 level. At the end of 1950 it reached 111% of the 1936 level — instead of the 81% envisaged in the plan. The socialised economy accounted for 60% of the total social product. The goal of the 2YP had thus been achieved and the state-owned sector had become the quantitatively and qualitatively dominant sector.[61]
A new generation
Those who took the solution of the problems into their own hands and developed a new form of co-operation shaped a new generation of workers and employees. Vocational schools were set up; in 1950, 50% of all apprentices were trained in state-owned industry, 16% in private capitalist industry and 33% in the skilled trades.[62] In contrast to most capitalist enterprises, the enterprises of state-owned industry were also the more modern, developing enterprises.
It is remarkable that the forms of new work were already created in this early phase. The spirit of a new beginning and revolutionary transformation played a big role here. Reconstruction brought with it many difficulties, but it also gave rise to a strong dynamic. It was no coincidence that young people were particularly receptive to the calls of the SED and the trade unions to produce more and help improve the production processes in order to live better. They were less inhibited by old traditions and were ready to build a new society.[63] The workers’ initiative was by no means continuous and stable. In some cases, it was triggered mainly by campaigns and then ebbed away again. Only after a period of development and stabilisation of the new conditions could it be made a permanent element of social life.
Nevertheless, the willingness of hundreds of thousands of people to work and think outside the box played a major role in the development of the economy. This is also reflected in the large number of voluntary labourers involved in the construction of major infrastructure projects, such as the water pipelines. The voluntary contributions of many workers in the countryside also represented an important contribution to establishing the new solidaristic working conditions.
The founding of the GDR
In 1949, the West’s policy of political confrontation came to a head. In May 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (“West Germany”) was founded, thus manifesting the division of the country. In October 1949, the SOZ reacted by founding the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Compared with its capitalist neighbour to the West, the GDR seemed to have no chance of survival: the GDR covered 30.4% of German territory, but only possessed 17.9% of the country’s pre-war industrial production. Natural resources were missing, there were major disproportions between the raw material and metalworking industries, and there was a lack of capacity for processing raw materials. The Western embargo, internal enemies, and sabotage by Western agents only exacerbated these factors.
State functions were now handed over to the GDR. New state bodies were formed, including the Central Commission for State Control, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office as well as the Ministry of Planning and Industry. In addition, the National Front was formed, whose committees were elected by residents’ assemblies.
In the following years, the GDR was able to build up a strong national economy and integrate many workers into this process. This was achieved despite an open border with the capitalist West, which created numerous economic problems, such as the poaching of skilled labourers, GDR citizens working illegally in the West (“cross-border commuting”), and the exploitation of currency differences and subsidized foods. The issue of labour productivity remained a central challenge in the GDR. The initiative of the workers, their level of awareness, and the work of the SED played an important role in addressing this issue.
Despite the successes of the 2YP, many things fell short of the pre-war level. Investment activity was low, and the now larger population (one fifth higher than pre-war levels) led to supply difficulties. In 1950, per capita consumption of meat and higher-value foodstuffs was only 25% of what it would later become in the 1970s. Potatoes and flour consumption, on the other hand, was 25% higher in 1950 than it would be in the 1970s.[64]
The changes in the working class were contradictory. While socialist consciousness was growing through the VEB, a still high proportion was employed in private industry, whose consciousness was less developed. The process of forming the working class was still in flux.
The founding of the GDR was a historic turning point in German history. The first workers’ and peasants’ state had been founded. It had learnt from the historical failures of capitalism, war, and fascism. In the years that followed, achievements were made that led to the emergence of a new economy in the hands of the people. It was able to withstand attempted coups and constant provocations from the West. But the problems remained: Productivity had to be constantly increased, competition from the West was fierce. Further publications will explore these and other issues.
Bibliography
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Badstübner, Rolf. Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Berlin: Dt. Verl. der Wiss., 1981.
Barthel, Horst. Adolf Hennecke: Beispiel und Vorbild. illustrierte historische hefte 16. Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1979.
Doernberg, Stefan. Kurze Geschichte der DDR. 3., Überarb. und erw. Aufl. Berlin: Dietz, 1968.
Keller, Dietmar. Lebendige Demokratie : der Übergang von der antifaschistischen zur sozialistischen Demokratie in der volkseigenen Industrie der DDR 1948 bis 1952. 1.Aufl. Berlin: Verl.Tribüne, 1971.
Mühlfriedel, Wolfgang. „Der Wirtschaftsplan 1948“. Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1985, Nr. 3 (1985).
„Die Industrie in der antifaschistischdemokratischen Umwälzung. Ein Bericht über Stand und Probleme der Forschungen zur Industriegeschichte“. Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook 22, Nr. 1 (Januar 1981). https://doi.org/10.1524/jbwg.1981.22.1.151.
„SAG-Betriebe – Schulen des Sozialismus“. Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook 1980, Nr. IV (1980).
Mühlfriedel, Wolfgang, und Klaus Wießner. Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965. Forschungen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte 25. Berlin: Akad.-Verl, 1989.
Polikeit, Georg. Die sogenannte DDR : Zahlen, Daten, Realitäten ; eine Landeskunde über den anderen Teil Deutschlands. Zentralbibliothek der Wirtschaftswissenschaften in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1966., 1966.
Roesler, Jörg. „Aufsicht und Kontrolle in den volkseigenen Industriebetrieben der DDR 1945 bis Anfang der sechziger Jahre“. Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook 23, Nr. 4 (Januar 1982). https://doi.org/10.1524/jbwg.1982.23.4.9.
Die Herausbildung der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft in der DDR. Forschungen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Berlin: Akademie-Verl., 1978.
Schiel, Ilse. Die ersten Jahre : Erinnerungen an den Beginn der revolutionären Umgestaltungen, 1985.
Stützner, Heinz. Von den Leistungen der Aktivisten der ersten Stunde bis zur Tat Adolf Henneckes. Karl-Marx-Stadt, o. J.
Ulbricht, Walter. Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung : in acht Bänden Von Mai 1945 bis 1949. Herausgegeben von Horst Bartel. Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Bd. Band 6. Berlin: Dietz, 1966.
Footnotes
[1] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 15.
[2] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, 25.
[3] Stützner, Von den Leistungen der Aktivisten der ersten Stunde bis zur Tat Adolf Henneckes, 7.
[4] Baar, Wirtschaftsgeschichte : ein Leitfaden, 180.
[5] Baar, 181.
[6] Baar, 181.
[7] Polikeit, Die sogenannte DDR : Zahlen, Daten, Realitäten ; eine Landeskunde über den anderen Teil Deutschlands, 21.
[8] Badstübner, Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 28.
[9] Badstübner, 30 f.
[10] See, for example, the KPD’s appeal of June 1945: https://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0009_ant&object=translation&st=&l=de
[11] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 70.
[12] Schiel, Die ersten Jahre : Erinnerungen an den Beginn der revolutionären Umgestaltungen. The quotations in the boxes are taken from this book. The page reference can be found there.
[13] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 36.
[14] Doernberg, Kurze Geschichte der DDR, 19.
[15] Doernberg, 22.
[16] Doernberg, 36.
[17] See https://ifddr.org/arbeiterbewegung-spaltung-deutschlands/
[18] Roesler, „Aufsicht und Kontrolle in den volkseigenen Industriebetrieben der DDR 1945 bis Anfang der sechziger Jahre“.
[19] Keller, Lebendige Demokratie : der Übergang von der antifaschistischen zur sozialistischen Demokratie in der volkseigenen Industrie der DDR 1948 bis 1952, 25.
[20] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 38.
[21] Badstübner, Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 65.
[22] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 41.
[23] Badstübner, Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 65; Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 42 f.
[24] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 42.
[25] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, 42.
[26] Badstübner, Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 65.
[27] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 52.
[28] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, 53 f.
[29] Badstübner, Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 67.
[30] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 50 f.
[31] Ulbricht, Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung : in acht Bänden Von Mai 1945 bis 1949, Band 6:179.
[32] Ulbricht, Band 6:179 ff.
[33] Ulbricht, Band 6:250.
[34] Roesler, Die Herausbildung der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft in der DDR, 12.
[35] Mühlfriedel, „Der Wirtschaftsplan 1948“.
[36] Roesler, Die Herausbildung der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft in der DDR, 7.
[37] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 136.
[38] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, 142.
[39] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, 142.
[40] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, 71. Here also more detailed information on the financial management of the VEB.
[41] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, 67 ff.
[42] Mühlfriedel, „SAG-Betriebe – Schulen des Sozialismus“.
[43] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 68.
[44] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, 74 ff.
[45] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, 79.
[46] Baar, Wirtschaftsgeschichte : ein Leitfaden, 187.
[47] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 79.
[48] Stützner, Von den Leistungen der Aktivisten der ersten Stunde bis zur Tat Adolf Henneckes, 14.
[49] Stützner, 19.
[50] Stützner, 26.
[51] Stützner, 29.
[52] Ulbricht, Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung : in acht Bänden Von Mai 1945 bis 1949, Band 6:279.
[53] Stützner, Von den Leistungen der Aktivisten der ersten Stunde bis zur Tat Adolf Henneckes, 31.
[54] Für eine genauere Beschreibung der Arbeit Henneckes und der Bewegung siehe Barthel, Adolf Hennecke: Beispiel und Vorbild.
[55] Ulbricht, Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung : in acht Bänden Von Mai 1945 bis 1949, Band 6:281.
[56] Stützner, Von den Leistungen der Aktivisten der ersten Stunde bis zur Tat Adolf Henneckes, 33.
[57] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 87.
[58] Mühlfriedel, „Die Industrie in der antifaschistischdemokratischen Umwälzung. Ein Bericht über Stand und Probleme der Forschungen zur Industriegeschichte“, 87.
[59] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 89 f.
[60] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, 91 f.
[61] Badstübner, Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 128 f.
[62] Mühlfriedel und Wießner, Die Geschichte der Industrie der DDR bis 1965, 125.
[63] Baar, Wirtschaftsgeschichte : ein Leitfaden, 184.
[64] Badstübner, Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 129 ff.
