Dossier: The Founding of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED)

A dossier to mark the 80th anni­ver­sary of the unifi­ca­tion of the Commu­nist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social Demo­cra­tic Party of Germany (SPD) in 1946.

20 April 2026

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The 1st of May 1946 in Leip­zig, two weeks after the unifi­ca­tion of the commu­nist and social demo­cra­tic parties.

Table of contents 

Introduction

On 21 April 1946 – almost a year after the defeat of fascism in Europe – the Commu­nist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social Demo­cra­tic Party (SPD) merged to form the Socia­list Unity Party (SED), uniting the orga­nised working-class move­ment within the Soviet-occu­p­ied zone of a shat­te­red, post-war Germany. After three deca­des of fratri­ci­dal divi­sion and twelve years of vicious repres­sion under fascism, the German labour move­ment was recon­sti­tu­ted upon a revo­lu­tio­nary Marxist basis. Promi­nent figu­res in both parties stres­sed the neces­sity of this histo­ric step, for reuni­fi­ca­tion was the only guaran­tee that “not the reac­tion­ary upper bour­geoi­sie but the working class and the labou­ring people [would] deter­mine the course of further deve­lo­p­ment” in post-war Germany.1 As a unified socia­list party with a mass base of over one million members, the SED went on to assume the vanguard role in the Soviet Occu­pa­tion Zone and lead the effort to cons­truct socia­lism in the German Demo­cra­tic Repu­blic (DDR).

Today, the domi­nant bour­geois histo­rio­gra­phy portrays this pivo­tal moment in German history as a “forced merger” (Zwangs­ver­ei­ni­gung) – a union impo­sed upon unwil­ling social demo­crats by Moscow. The charge of “coer­cion” has become so thoroughly embedded in popu­lar discourse that it is today widely accepted and uncri­ti­cally repro­du­ced, even by much of the poli­ti­cal left. As the histo­rian Günter Benser obser­ved in 1995, West German histo­ri­ans had, in the later deca­des of the “Cold War”, begun to adopt a more nuan­ced posi­tion on the ques­tion – conce­ding that substan­tial sections of the SPD had in fact supported unifi­ca­tion out of convic­tion.2) Yet the defeat of socia­lism in Europe in 1989 ushe­red in a trium­phant reas­ser­tion of anti-commu­nist narra­ti­ves around the foun­ding of the SED. The DDR was summa­rily dismissed as an “unjust state” (Unrecht­staat), and the “forced merger” of the KPD and SPD was cast as the origi­nal sin – the gene­sis of what was bran­ded the “SED dicta­tor­ship” in the East. Such conte­sta­ti­ons over coll­ec­tive memory are proof that the writing of history is never a neutral enter­prise, but an active site of struggle between class inte­rests and ideologies.

To mark the 80th anni­ver­sary of the merger, the follo­wing dossier aims to shed light on the concrete circum­s­tances surroun­ding this conten­tious histo­ri­cal junc­ture, drawing on signi­fi­cant yet over­loo­ked aspects in order to encou­rage a more nuan­ced and infor­med analysis.

Many exis­ting accounts of the merger too often fixate on the narrow ques­tion of whether the Soviet Mili­tary Admi­nis­tra­tion inter­vened in the unifi­ca­tion process in late 1945 and early 1946. What the “forced merger” narra­tive inva­ria­bly down­plays is the elemen­tary fact that Germany was a mili­ta­rily occu­p­ied coun­try at the time, as the Wehr­macht had uncon­di­tio­nally surren­de­red to the Anti-Hitler Coali­tion in May 1945. Inter­ven­tion in dome­stic affairs by foreign mili­tary admi­nis­tra­tion is the very defi­ni­tion of occu­pa­tion. One need only recall the signi­fi­cant inter­fe­rence by Western mili­tary admi­nis­tra­ti­ons in their respec­tive zones – e.g., the thwar­ting of demo­cra­tic refe­renda on natio­na­li­sa­tion and land reform initia­ti­ves, the prohi­bi­tion of the SED and cross-indus­try trade unions, the violent suppres­sion of protests by the US mili­tary, etc. – to dispel any notion that poli­ti­cal encroach­ment was the exclu­sive preserve of Soviet “dicta­to­rial prac­ti­ces” in post-war Germany. The more histo­ri­cally decisive ques­tion, and the one this dossier sets out to address, is whether Soviet impo­si­tion was the deter­mi­ning factor in brin­ging the SED into exis­tence. Was this new party arti­fi­ci­ally cons­truc­ted by Moscow or did it repre­sent the genuine will of its 1.3 million foun­ding members? And, rela­ted to this ques­tion, was the “Bols­he­vi­za­tion” of the SED that follo­wed in 1948/49 pre-programmed by the commu­nists as part of a secret plot or was it the product of the subse­quent parti­tion of Germany and the need to adapt to new conditions?

This dossier explo­res these ques­ti­ons by assembling contri­bu­ti­ons from three histo­ri­ans. Reiner Zilkenat provi­des a chro­no­logy of the unifi­ca­tion process and combi­nes this with a speci­fic inves­ti­ga­tion of deve­lo­p­ments in Neukölln, a district of West Berlin over which the Soviet Mili­tary Admi­nis­tra­tion had no autho­rity and can thus not be accu­sed of pres­su­ring social demo­crats into a merger. Zilkenat outlines the central points of ideo­lo­gi­cal unity and dissen­sion between commu­nists and social demo­crats after the war. For the “old guard” in both parties, unifi­ca­tion meant confron­ting and over­co­ming deca­des of accu­mu­la­ted mistrust and enga­ging in a self-criti­cal recko­ning with the failed poli­ti­cal stra­te­gies of the Weimar era (1918–1933).3 Within the KPD, the “new poli­ti­cal line” encoun­te­red resis­tance in certain quar­ters, as it repre­sen­ted a signi­fi­cant depar­ture from estab­lished commu­nist party prac­tice – reori­en­ting the party away from the cadre model and towards a broa­der, mass member­ship base. In the SPD, a stark rift swiftly emer­ged between those who sought to draw genuine lessons from past mista­kes and those who clung on to anti-commu­nism and refor­mism. For those who sought to sabo­tage unity, this heigh­tened and emotio­nally char­ged atmo­sphere natu­rally affor­ded ample oppor­tu­nity for disrup­tion and mani­pu­la­tion. Kurt Schu­ma­cher – who as leader of the anti-unifi­ca­tion faction of the SPD was supported by the British mili­tary admi­nis­tra­tion – was so beli­ger­ent and Russo­pho­bic in his rheto­ric, that Soviet mili­tary offi­ci­als soon came to regard the SPD as “the first legal anti-Soviet party in Germany” follo­wing the war.4 Zilkenat concludes his article with a criti­cal apprai­sal of the inter­nal plebi­s­cite held in the SPD on 31 March 1946 – a vote frequently cited by the SED’s detrac­tors as a key piece of evidence support­ing the “forced merger” claim.

1st of May 1946 in Berlin.

The brief excerpt by Günter Benser is drawn from one of his longer mono­graphs on the SED’s foun­ding and offers a statis­ti­cal portrait of the party’s compo­si­tion – figu­res which, in them­sel­ves, attest to the breadth of support and accep­tance the party across the Soviet Occu­p­ied Zone. The text by Leo Schwarz argues that the SED’s initial stra­tegy of buil­ding a prole­ta­rian umbrella party was ulti­m­ately frus­tra­ted by the Western powers’ impo­si­tion of Germany’s parti­tion and their prohi­bi­tion of any reuni­fi­ca­tion of the labour move­ment within their occu­pa­tion zones. These objec­tive condi­ti­ons compel­led the young party, in 1948, to reori­ent itself around the Leni­nist concep­tion of a “party of a new type” – one capa­ble of assum­ing the leading role in the workers’ and peasants’ state that was then proclai­med in Octo­ber 1949, five months after the foun­ding of the West German state.

The final text in the dossier is a repro­duc­tion of a joint decla­ra­tion issued by the leader­ships of the KPD and SPD in Janu­ary 1946, calling upon the members of both parties to coll­ec­tively air their diffe­ren­ces and reckon with the past. This primary docu­ment reve­als the common plat­form upon which working-class unity was to be estab­lished. It also reflects the gene­ral poli­ti­cal atmo­sphere after the war. Fascism had brought death and destruc­tion to Europe – inclu­ding to Germany. This cata­stro­phe left capi­ta­lism and the social order that gave rise to it thoroughly discredi­ted. Popu­lar demands for the prose­cu­tion of war profi­te­ers, land reform, and the expro­pria­tion of the mono­poly bour­geoi­sie resounded well beyond the Soviet Occu­pa­tion Zone and the orga­nised labour move­ment. Even the conser­va­tive forces of the Chris­tian Demo­cra­tic Union (CDU) called for socia­lism and wide-ranging natio­na­liza­ti­ons in 1947. The shared expe­ri­ence of suffe­ring under fascism crea­ted common ground for anti-fascist, demo­cra­tic rene­wal in post-war Germany. It was this, and not coer­cion, that consti­tu­ted the decisive driving force behind cross-party unity after 1945.

The foun­ding of the SED will undoub­tedly remain a contes­ted ques­tion in the histo­rio­gra­phy of modern Germany. What is diffi­cult to dispute, howe­ver, is that history ulti­m­ately vindi­ca­ted the logic upon which the party was estab­lished. The demands that anima­ted the German people in 1945 and 1946 – the socia­li­sa­tion of the economy, the tran­s­cen­dence of capi­ta­lism, and the thorough­go­ing anti-fascist trans­for­ma­tion of society – were reali­sed only in the East. In West Germany, the lofty promi­ses of socia­lism advan­ced by the CDU and SPD were swiftly aban­do­ned. The workers’ move­ment remained divi­ded, anti-commu­nism was rein­sta­ted as state doctrine, and the peace move­ment was crimi­na­li­sed. Nazi war profi­te­ers retai­ned their posi­ti­ons and mono­poly capi­ta­lism was resto­red. Only the SED – with its hundreds of thou­sands of members – was capa­ble of carry­ing the labour move­men­t’s histo­ric demands forward. Without the unity party, there would have been no DDR, and no socia­lism on German soil. It is ther­e­fore all the more neces­sary to engage seriously with the history of the SED beyond the blan­ket condem­na­ti­ons of bour­geois histo­rio­gra­phy – for it was within this party that Germany’s first and only expe­ri­en­ces of socia­list cons­truc­tion were lived, accu­mu­la­ted, and preser­ved for posterity.

Reiner Zilkenat: Communists and Social Democrats on the path to unity

Reiner Zilkenat (1950–2020) was a histo­rian and author. He studied history and poli­ti­cal science at the Free Univer­sity of Berlin and subse­quently worked with the histo­rian Rein­hard Rürup at the Tech­ni­cal Univer­sity of Berlin. His rese­arch focu­sed on the history of the German labour move­ment, the final phase of the Weimar Repu­blic, and the rise of the Nazi Party. The follo­wing article is an extract from the book­let “Beiträge zur Berli­ner Geschichte”, edited by Rainer Perschew­ski et al., 2011. 

The Libe­ra­tion

With the uncon­di­tio­nal surren­der of Hitler’s Germany on 8 May 1945 – the Nazi units fight­ing in Berlin had alre­ady laid down their arms on 2 May 1945 – the condi­ti­ons had been crea­ted, from a histo­ri­cal perspec­tive, to estab­lish a demo­cra­tic and peaceful Germany. Poli­ti­cal power was exer­cised by the Allies, who had divi­ded Germany into four occu­pa­tion zones in accordance with the decis­i­ons of the confe­ren­ces in Yalta (Febru­ary 1945) and Pots­dam (July/August 1945). Berlin, as had alre­ady been stipu­la­ted in the rele­vant London Proto­col of the Allies dated 12 Septem­ber 1944, became the seat of the Allied Control Coun­cil as the capi­tal of Germany. Its districts were assi­gned to four Allied sectors. On 2 July, the first units of the US Army ente­red Berlin and, in the weeks that follo­wed, also assu­med respon­si­bi­lity in Neukölln. Howe­ver, the orders and direc­ti­ves previously issued by the Soviet Mili­tary Admi­nis­tra­tion in Germany (SMAD) remained in force in accordance with an inter-Allied agree­ment. This applied not least to SMAD Order No. 2 of 10 June, which permit­ted the forma­tion of anti-fascist parties. In the Western zones, the estab­lish­ment of parties was not yet envi­sa­ged at that time.

From the survi­ving files held in the Berlin State Archi­ves, as well as the contem­po­rary press, we can see that commu­nist and social demo­cra­tic anti-fascists became active almost as soon as the fight­ing had ceased:

Firstly, they spon­ta­neously took the initia­tive in the arduous attempt to bring about a gradual norma­li­sa­tion of life. […] A system of anti-fascist house repre­sen­ta­ti­ves emer­ged, which proved indis­pensable for regis­tering the survi­ving popu­la­tion, distri­bu­ting food and allo­ca­ting housing, as well as orga­ni­s­ing clearance opera­ti­ons. The buil­ding repre­sen­ta­ti­ves supported the Allied command posts and the local admi­nis­tra­ti­ons that had since been estab­lished, which had been set up by the Soviet autho­ri­ties imme­dia­tely after the end of hostilities.

Secondly, commu­nists and social demo­crats, as well as Chris­tian and libe­ral-demo­cra­tic forces, began to form their parties with the expli­cit appr­oval and support of the Soviet command. […] An analy­sis by the US intel­li­gence service dated 19 Octo­ber 1945, entit­led “Obser­va­tions on the Poli­ti­cal Scene in Berlin”, stated the follo­wing: “The emer­gence of the parties in Berlin is largely to be explai­ned by the neces­sity of crea­ting an orga­ni­sa­tion capa­ble of taking on the requi­red admi­nis­tra­tive tasks. Gene­rally spea­king, the Russi­ans proceed in occu­p­ied count­ries by exer­cis­ing only super­vi­sion and indi­rect control. They leave the imple­men­ta­tion of speci­fic admi­nis­tra­tive measu­res to local govern­ments, which more or less all repre­sent the groups that oppo­sed fascism. By autho­ri­sing and promo­ting anti-fascist parties, the Russi­ans have set the course for such a deve­lo­p­ment in their occu­pa­tion zone.”5

In Neukölln, as in all other city districts, joint working commit­tees of the KPD and SPD were also estab­lished at district level. They formed one of the essen­tial foun­da­ti­ons for the party unifi­ca­tion process. This was not merely a matter of pursuing a consen­sual policy aimed at ensu­ring the district’s recon­s­truc­tion, but of enga­ging in an inten­sive, open and criti­cal discus­sion of the pres­sing poli­ti­cal issues that had become urgent in the face of the disas­trous poli­cies of German impe­ria­lism, which had plun­ged the world into war twice in the 20th century: What must be done to make any attempt by German impe­ria­lism to stage a third “grasp for world power” impos­si­ble from the outset? What form must the econo­mic, social and poli­ti­cal order take to ensure that war can never again emanate from German soil? There was a wide­spread convic­tion that fascism and war ulti­m­ately had their roots in the capi­ta­list social order, and this convic­tion was held not only by members and support­ers of the two workers’ parties, but also by the bour­geois parties (the Chris­tian Demo­cra­tic Union and the Libe­ral Demo­cra­tic Party). Calls for the punish­ment and expro­pria­tion of war crimi­nals, the removal of form­erly active Nazis from public life, the natio­na­li­sa­tion of corpo­ra­ti­ons – parti­cu­larly in heavy indus­try – as well as banks, insu­rance compa­nies and large estates, and for econo­mic plan­ning rather than a capi­ta­list market economy, were certainly popu­lar among large sections of the population.

An SPD poster from 1945/46: “Mate! The mining barons have fallen. Watch out! Only unity makes the labour move­ment strong!”
An KPD poster from 1945/46: “The unity of all workers guaran­tees the victory of our work”.

Unity of the workers’ parties – on what basis?

Imme­dia­tely after the libe­ra­tion, there were quite a few voices within the SPD calling for an imme­diate merger with the KPD, for the estab­lish­ment of socia­lism “as a matter of urgency”, and for the imme­diate crea­tion of a united party compri­sing Social Demo­crats and Commu­nists. The Commu­nists also argued in prin­ci­ple for unifi­ca­tion, but they advo­ca­ted first discus­sing in great detail and with care the ideo­lo­gi­cal and poli­ti­cal basis on which the envi­sa­ged Socia­list Unity Party was to be estab­lished. In doing so, it was neces­sary, among other things, for both parties to take a self-criti­cal look at their respec­tive poli­cies during the Weimar Repu­blic and to learn lessons from them. It was also essen­tial, they argued, to define precis­ely the ideo­lo­gi­cal basis on which the Unity Party was to be consti­tu­ted. Finally, they main­tai­ned that it was neces­sary to formu­late in all open­ness what socia­lism and the path towards it should look like, as this must be the long-term goal. The KPD took the view that, before the estab­lish­ment of socia­lism could even be conside­red, an anti-fascist demo­cra­tic order with exten­sive social and demo­cra­tic rights for the working people and all demo­cra­ti­cally minded citi­zens had to be crea­ted and deve­lo­ped. This had alre­ady been clearly arti­cu­la­ted in the appeal issued by the party’s Central Commit­tee on 11 June 1945. In a complex, contra­dic­tory, yet ulti­m­ately very produc­tive process of discus­sion and mutual under­stan­ding, a consen­sus emer­ged which – in brief – encom­pas­sed the follo­wing points.

Firstly, it had to be ensu­red that the mista­kes of 1918–19 would not be repea­ted. The motto “The Kaiser is gone, the gene­rals remain!” cannot be repea­ted a second time.6 What did this mean in concrete terms? It invol­ved inter­ven­ti­ons in private owner­ship of the key means of produc­tion, the dismant­ling of large-scale landow­ner­ship east of the Elbe River as the mate­rial basis of Prus­sian mili­ta­rism, a radi­cal demo­cra­tis­a­tion of the admi­nis­tra­tion and the judi­ciary, a reform of educa­tion and higher educa­tion in favour of the child­ren of the working class and the peas­an­try, the rene­wal of German cultu­ral life on the basis of huma­nist tradi­ti­ons, the punish­ment of war crimi­nals, and the comba­ting of all forms of mili­ta­ristic, natio­na­li­stic and Nazi malice in all areas of society.

In this, the KPD and SPD were also in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Allied reso­lu­ti­ons adopted at the Pots­dam Conference.

Secondly, only revo­lu­tio­nary Marxism could consti­tute the ideo­lo­gi­cal foun­da­tion of a unified socia­list party. It was agreed that the basis for the formu­la­tion of the SED’s programme and poli­cies would be: the “Mani­festo of the Commu­nist Party” by Karl Marx and Fried­rich Engels; the “Erfurt Programme” of the Social Demo­crats from 1891, largely formu­la­ted by Karl Kaut­sky; and the “Critique of the Gotha Programme”, penned by Marx in 1875.

Thirdly, the path to socia­lism to be taken in the future was descri­bed as a “special German path to socia­lism”, as Anton Acker­mann, a candi­date for the Polit­buro of the KPD, put it in the first issue of the joint theo­re­ti­cal jour­nal Einheit (Unity) in Febru­ary 1946.7 In contrast to deve­lo­p­ments follo­wing the Octo­ber Revo­lu­tion in Russia, it was argued that in Germany it would be possi­ble to achieve socia­lism through inter­me­diate steps and without the use of violence. This, it was clai­med, depen­ded on the further course of social and poli­ti­cal deve­lo­p­ment: “If the new demo­cra­tic state deve­lops into a new instru­ment of violence in the hands of reac­tion­ary forces, then a peaceful tran­si­tion to socia­list trans­for­ma­tion is impos­si­ble. But if the anti-fascist demo­cra­tic repu­blic deve­lops as a state of all working people under the leader­ship of the working class, then the peaceful path to socia­lism is enti­rely possi­ble, inso­far as the use of force against the (inci­den­tally, enti­rely legal, enti­rely legi­ti­mate) claim of the working class to full power is then impos­si­ble.”8 This also corre­spon­ded to the view of the Soviet party and state leader­ship, which, through Stalin, had instruc­ted the KPD dele­gate, Walter Ulbricht—who had been in Moscow for consul­ta­ti­ons from 28 Janu­ary to 6 Febru­ary 1946—as follows: “… take into account [parlia­men­tary] tradi­ti­ons in the West”, “the demo­cra­tic path to workers’ power – not dicta­tor­ship.”9

These three points repre­sen­ted, in a sense, the basic consen­sus that under­pin­ned the foun­ding of the Socia­list Unity Party of Germany.

The back­ground to the unifi­ca­tion: Decem­ber 1945 to April 1946

With the “First Confe­rence of Sixty” – held in Berlin on 20 and 21 Decem­ber 1945 and consis­ting of thirty repre­sen­ta­ti­ves each from the SPD and the KPD – prepa­ra­ti­ons for the crea­tion of the SED ente­red a new, decisive phase. The deba­tes held over the two days were, in part, extre­mely conten­tious.10 Howe­ver, the SPD chair­man, Otto Grote­wohl, made it clear from the very first sentence of his speech that, despite all the diffe­ren­ces of opinion that still exis­ted, one thing was certain: “There is no debate about the unity of the working class: it is neces­sary.”11 In the end, the reali­sa­tion prevai­led that there was no reasonable alter­na­tive to the unifi­ca­tion of the two parties. Thus, the decis­ion was taken to further deepen the unity of action between the two parties, which was alre­ady being prac­ti­sed, and which was inten­ded to form the “prelude to the reali­sa­tion of the poli­ti­cal and orga­ni­sa­tio­nal unity of the labour move­ment, i.e. to the merger of the Social Demo­cra­tic Party of Germany with the Commu­nist Party of Germany into a unified party”.12 A study commis­sion was set up to prepare the programme of the future party. It was also deci­ded, amongst other things, to carry out “lively joint study circle and trai­ning acti­vi­ties”13 and to estab­lish a joint publi­shing house and the afore­men­tio­ned theo­re­ti­cal jour­nal Einheit.

The entrance to the Steel­works Riesa, which was owned by the Nazi war crimi­nal Fried­rich Flick prior to being expro­pria­ted in 1945 and natio­na­li­zed as “A Peop­le’s Enter­prise”. The sign on the left reads: “War crimi­nals! Hands off the peop­le’s property. Protect your factory through unity!” The sign on the right reads: “Only the unity of all labou­rers will garan­tee peace among the people”.

A merger of the two parties within a short time­frame, initi­ally in the Soviet Occu­pa­tion Zone, was rejec­ted by the SPD Central Execu­tive. The reasons for this lay, on the one hand, in the fear that this would jeopar­dise the party’s unity across Germany; on the other hand, forces had mean­while formed within the Social Demo­cra­tic move­ment that were growing ever stron­ger and strictly oppo­sed a merger with the KPD, or even a deepe­ning of the unity of action. This will be discus­sed further below. On 26 Febru­ary 1946, when the “Second Confe­rence of Sixty” met again in Berlin, the orga­ni­sa­tio­nal reso­lu­tion adopted there nevert­hel­ess deci­ded on the forma­tion of the Socia­list Unity Party of Germany at a joint party congress to be held on 21 and 22 April at the Admi­rals­pa­last in Berlin. This would be imme­dia­tely prece­ded by party congres­ses of the KPD and the SPD, which would take the final decis­ion on unifi­ca­tion. At the same time, the “Prin­ci­ples and Objec­ti­ves” and the party consti­tu­tion of the SED, which had been drawn up by the afore­men­tio­ned study commis­sion, were discus­sed and adopted as drafts for the unifi­ca­tion party congress.

The dispu­tes surroun­ding the crea­tion of the SED were by no means over; on the contrary, they inten­si­fied in a manner never seen before.

Kurt Schu­ma­cher and his fight against unity

Oppo­si­tion to the unifi­ca­tion of the two workers’ parties is rightly asso­cia­ted first and fore­most with the name of Kurt Schu­ma­cher. Born on 13 Octo­ber 1895, a member of the SPD since 1918, elec­ted to the German Reichs­tag in Septem­ber 1930, impri­so­ned by the Nazis almost conti­nuously from 1933 to 1945 as a man sever­ely woun­ded in the First World War, he opened the “Dr Schu­ma­cher Office” in Hano­ver imme­dia­tely after the libe­ra­tion. From here, with the support of the British occu­py­ing forces, he sought to estab­lish hims­elf as the leading figure within the SPD even before poli­ti­cal parties were lega­li­sed in the Western zones. He regarded the Central Execu­tive in Berlin, led by the former Reichs­tag member and Bruns­wick state chair­man Otto Grote­wohl, as well as the SPD’s exile execu­tive commit­tee based in London […] as trou­ble­some rivals, whom he sought to elimi­nate with single-minded determination.

[…] His world­view was rigidly focu­sed on reali­sing socia­lism exclu­si­vely through the gradual seizure of state power by the Social Demo­crats, as it were “from above”, rather than through extra-parlia­men­tary class strug­gles. Commu­nists could only serve as disrup­tive factors here. The state, not society, always remained the most important start­ing point and goal of his thin­king. He viewed only the mista­kes commit­ted by the KPD during the Weimar Repu­blic in a one-sided manner; the no less serious social-demo­cra­tic errors and omis­si­ons played no signi­fi­cant role in his worldview.

In his dealings with the Central Execu­tive led by Otto Grote­wohl, Schu­ma­cher repea­tedly played his “trump card”: a merger of the two workers’ parties could only be deci­ded by a natio­nal confe­rence of the SPD; a Socia­list Unity Party essen­ti­ally confi­ned to the Soviet Occu­pa­tion Zone would encou­rage the divi­sion of Germany. Schu­ma­cher had seve­ral discus­sions with Grote­wohl and other members of the Central Execu­tive, in which, along­side his accu­sa­ti­ons of divi­sion, he also alle­ged that they were merely conduc­ting the poli­ti­cal busi­ness of the SMAD and the KPD. The latter he descri­bed as enti­rely depen­dent on the former; it was not a “German” but a “Russian” party. He hims­elf, howe­ver, did ever­y­thing in his power to isolate the SPD in the Western zones from the party orga­ni­sa­tion in the Soviet Occu­pa­tion Zone. A turning point in this regard was the confe­rence he orga­nised in Wennigsen (Lower Saxony) in Octo­ber 1945, which was to take place without the parti­ci­pa­tion of repre­sen­ta­ti­ves of the SPD’s Central Execu­tive and was inten­ded to endorse Schumacher’s claim to leader­ship in the Western zones.

Schumacher’s seeds take root in Berlin

Kurt Schu­ma­cher was stron­gly focu­sed on exten­ding his sphere of poli­ti­cal influence to Berlin as well, parti­cu­larly to the western sectors of the city, where he hoped, not without reason, for support from the Ameri­cans, British and French – who were in control – for his struggle against the unifi­ca­tion of the two workers’ parties. At the same time, he accu­ra­tely asses­sed the state of mind of large sections of the popu­la­tion after twelve years of fascist indoc­tri­na­tion. He remained shaped by anti-commu­nism and anti-Sovie­tism. Even in the minds of many contem­po­r­a­ries who since­rely advo­ca­ted for an anti-fascist Germany, there still exis­ted more or less prono­un­ced “resi­dual elements” of fascist ideo­logy. How could it have been other­wise? This was where he inten­ded to start in order to torpedo the impen­ding unifi­ca­tion of the two workers’ parties.

Schumacher’s most poli­ti­cally signi­fi­cant “repre­sen­ta­tive” in Berlin and the undis­pu­ted leading figure in the struggle against the foun­ding of the SED was Franz Neumann, a bril­li­ant orator who, prior to the fascist seizure of power, had worked as a young clerk at the Prenz­lauer Berg district office and went on to serve as the West Berlin regio­nal chair­man of the SPD from 1946 to 1958. Other signi­fi­cant figu­res included: Gustav Klin­gel­hö­fer, editor of the Social Demo­cra­tic daily news­pa­per Vorwärts prior to 1933 and later Sena­tor for Econo­mic Affairs and Indus­try in West Berlin; Curt Swolinzky, district chair­man of the SPD in Tempel­hof in 1945–46, a parti­cu­larly mili­tant anti-commu­nist whose verbal attacks on commu­nists and pro-unifi­ca­tion social demo­crats were every bit as fierce as Schumacher’s; Arno Scholz, editor of Vorwärts before 1933, foun­der and editor-in-chief of the daily news­pa­per Tele­graf in 1946, which, toge­ther with the Tages­spie­gel, became the most important mouth­piece of the oppon­ents of reunification.

The phrase “Zwangs­ver­ei­ni­gung” (forced merger) was coined by the social demo­crat Gustav Dahren­dorf, who origi­nally campai­gned for unity in Berlin, but moved to Hamburg in Febru­ary 1946 after brea­king with his comra­des in the “Russian zone”.

It soon became appa­rent that Schu­ma­cher and his men in Berlin, parti­cu­larly in the western sectors, were pulling out all the stops of demago­guery to achieve their goal. Schu­ma­cher hims­elf appeared on seve­ral occa­si­ons before large audi­en­ces at SPD events in Berlin, where, in his own charac­te­ristic manner—that is, with fierce anti-Commu­nist and anti-Soviet polemics—he stir­red up senti­ment against the unifi­ca­tion of the two workers’ parties. Toge­ther with Franz Neumann, he devi­sed a plan to hold a “plebi­s­cite” among the Social Demo­cra­tic Party members in Berlin, for which, inci­den­tally, there was no basis in the SPD’s consti­tu­tion or programme documents.

Nevert­hel­ess, this vote was held on 31 March 1946 in the western districts of Berlin; in the Soviet sector, it had been banned by the occu­py­ing power. The SPD Central Execu­tive had […] called on Social Demo­crats to boycott this vote.

The “plebi­s­cite” and the situa­tion in the Neukölln SPD

Two ques­ti­ons were put to the Social Demo­crats in this vote. First ques­tion: “Are you in favour of the imme­diate merger of both workers’ parties[?]” Second ques­tion: “Are you in favour of an alli­ance between both parties that ensu­res joint work and excludes inter­nal strife?”

On the proble­ma­tic nature of these ques­ti­ons, Günter Benser writes: “Firstly, it is striking that there is talk of the ‘two workers’ parties’. This was not without demago­guery, inso­far as the initia­tors of the plebi­s­cite viewed the Commu­nists more as a Moscow-aligned, anti-demo­cra­tic orga­ni­sa­tion to be reso­lut­ely oppo­sed, rather than as an equal workers’ party. The diver­sion from the funda­men­tal ques­tion ‘For or against the united party’ by empha­sis­ing the pace of a merger, and the focus on an imme­diate union, was also a deli­be­rate choice. The second ques­tion suggested an alter­na­tive to the united party, which, strictly spea­king, had become obso­lete precis­ely because of the events of March 1946 (the anti-commu­nist tira­des and actions of Franz Neumann and Co. – R.Z.). Indeed, given the confron­ta­ti­ons that escala­ted with the plebi­s­cite, there was little chance of retur­ning to an ‘alli­ance’, to ‘joint work’ that ‘excludes fratri­ci­dal struggle’.”14

It should also be empha­sised that this plebi­s­cite did not in every instance comply with the demo­cra­tic conven­ti­ons of “free elec­tions”. For instance, Allied offi­cers acting as obser­vers of this plebi­s­cite repor­ted on the occa­sio­nal prac­tice wher­eby member­ship cards did not record who had alre­ady cast their vote. This meant that multi­ple votes were possi­ble (Span­dau). Ballot papers from some of the ballot boxes had also “disap­peared”; the elec­tion results were merely commu­ni­ca­ted by tele­phone (Tempel­hof).15

Berlin, 1946: Campai­gners for unity between the KPD and SPD.

In Neukölln, the results of the ballot were as follows: 19.7 per cent of voters answe­red “yes” to Ques­tion 1, and 75.3 per cent answe­red “no”; the corre­spon­ding results for Ques­tion 2 were: 65.2 per cent “yes” votes and 17.8 per cent “no” votes. How should this result be inter­pre­ted? Firstly, it should be empha­sised that since Febru­ary 1946, a large number of members of Neukölln’s work­force, for exam­ple at the train company or, nota­bly, within the police force, had draf­ted reso­lu­ti­ons in favour of unifi­ca­tion and sent them to the Central Execu­tive of the SPD and the Central Commit­tee of the KPD. Some of the signa­to­ries noted whether they were members of the KPD or the SPD. The argu­ment frequently encoun­te­red among bour­geois authors – that such demons­tra­ti­ons were “orga­nised” or mani­pu­la­ted by the KPD, or “forced” by the SMAD – cannot seriously apply to Neukölln, which lay within the US sector. It is simply absurd. Rather, it appears that in many work­places, not only in the district of Neukölln, there was a posi­tive mood towards unification. […]

Parti­cu­larly note­wor­thy is the fact that the first and second district chair­men of the SPD, Richard Günther and Hell­mut Bock, were among the staun­chest support­ers of the unity party. They not only propa­ga­ted their views on this matter at their party’s events in Neukölln, but also advo­ca­ted in news­pa­per artic­les for active enga­ge­ment in the crea­tion of the SED. It is also worth noting the follo­wing fact, which illus­tra­tes just how compli­ca­ted the situa­tion was at the time within the Neukölln SPD: Ten days before the unifi­ca­tion party confe­rence at the Admi­rals­pa­last and twelve days after the plebi­s­cite, dele­ga­tes to the SPD party confe­rence – which was to take place imme­dia­tely before the unifi­ca­tion party confe­rence – were elec­ted at the Social Demo­cra­tic ‘district repre­sen­ta­ti­ves’ meeting’ at the Kindl Brewery on Hermannstraße.

One would have expec­ted that, given the result of the plebi­s­cite in Neukölln descri­bed above, Richard Günther and Hell­mut Bock would have stood no chance of being elec­ted and that, logi­cally, oppon­ents of unifi­ca­tion would instead have been given the mandate. Yet instead, Günther recei­ved 451 out of 456 valid votes. He thus achie­ved the best result and was elec­ted as a dele­gate to the party confe­rence. Bock recei­ved 423 votes and was one of five substi­tute dele­ga­tes. Fridel Hoff­mann, who had also come out in favour of forming the united party, was like­wise elec­ted as a party congress dele­gate with the second-highest number of votes cast (she recei­ved just one vote fewer than Richard Günther).

This leaves the ques­tion to be answe­red as to why, in Neukölln, a clear majo­rity of Social Demo­crats nevert­hel­ess voted against imme­diate unifi­ca­tion with the KPD in the plebi­s­cite. In addi­tion to the reasons cited by Günter Benser (which were to be found in the cleverly worded ques­ti­ons them­sel­ves) there were two further causes.

Firstly, the anti-Sovie­tism that was massi­vely intro­du­ced into the debate by the oppon­ents of unity, which, enti­rely in line with Schumacher’s thin­king, defa­med the KPD as an exten­sion of the SMAD, indeed as a mere puppet of “the Russi­ans”. The atro­ci­ties commit­ted by Soviet soldiers during their march into Berlin (looting, rape) were also repea­tedly brought up. They were, so to speak, retro­s­pec­tively blamed on the KPD. It should be noted in passing that simi­lar inci­dents on the part of the Western Allies were hushed up: For exam­ple, the fact that thou­sands of captu­red German soldiers in the primi­tive camps set up by the US Army on the Rhine meadows, where in some cases holes in the ground served as “accom­mo­da­tion”, had been left to die of dise­ase or star­va­tion, or the exces­ses commit­ted by French troops during their entry into Stutt­gart and other places in Baden-Würt­tem­berg.16

Otto Grote­wohl addres­ses workers on the 1st of May 1946 in Berlin.

Secondly, the Western Allies had made it clear that they did not wish to see the unifi­ca­tion of the two workers’ parties in their sectors. Thus, in Neukölln, the US Command subjec­ted the advo­ca­tes of unifi­ca­tion – and even more so after the forma­tion of the SED – to a variety of harass­ment, inti­mi­da­tion, thre­ats and bans on events. This, and the fact that in the Western zones efforts to create a unity party were strictly thwar­ted17, did not go unno­ti­ced by the West Berlin Social Demo­crats and certainly influen­ced the voting beha­viour of quite a few of them in the plebi­s­cite on 31 March 1946. Such clear signals from the Western occu­py­ing powers, on whose good­will and disp­lea­sure they depen­ded, could not fail to have an impact. In short: quite a few voted as the Western occu­py­ing powers wished.

Ulti­m­ately, it is clear that the unity party estab­lished in April 1946 also met with unmist­aka­ble appr­oval in what was then Neukölln. Richard Günther, Hell­mut Bock and Frie­del Hoff­mann were offi­ci­als of the SED for many years, albeit not in their home district, but in the Soviet Occu­pa­tion Zone and the DDR due to the unfol­ding Cold War. […]

Günter Benser: The creation of a mass party

Günter Benser (1931–2025) was a histo­rian and univer­sity lectu­rer. He studied history in Leip­zig and later became a profes­sor at the Insti­tute for Marxism-Leni­nism at the Central Commit­tee of the SED. After 1990, he took part in the foun­ding of the Förder­krei­ses Archive und Biblio­the­ken zur Geschichte der Arbei­ter­be­we­gung (Asso­cia­tion for the Promo­tion of Archi­ves and Libra­ries on the History of the Labour Move­ment). The follo­wing excerpt is taken from a lecture (“Zusam­men­schluss von KPD und SPD. Anmer­kun­gen zu einer neube­leb­ten Diskus­sion”) deli­vered at a confe­rence orga­nised by the des Jenaer Forums für Bildung und Wissen­schaft e.V. and the History Working Group of the Thurin­gian State Execu­tive Commit­tee of the Party of Demo­cra­tic Socia­lism (PDS) on 10 Febru­ary 1996.

[…] The foun­ding of the SED, howe­ver, was more than just the merging of a commu­nist and a social demo­cra­tic cadre of offi­ci­als, even though this was at the heart of the party merger. It invol­ved the decis­i­ons and concerns of 1.3 million men, women and youth orga­nised within the SPD or the KPD. Very few of these people poss­es­sed a strong social demo­cra­tic or commu­nist iden­tity, and so could not lose it even through a unified party.

Of the KPD members, at most one in ten had been a party member before 1933; of the SPD members – I esti­mate – at most one in three or four. A large propor­tion of these people had joined the KPD or the SPD at a time when the merger was alre­ady an openly declared and justi­fied aim of both parties. It is diffi­cult to see why the united party should have been an outrage to such members, or why it must have been percei­ved as a compul­sion. Of course, both oppon­ents and support­ers were keen to invoke majo­ri­ties and clai­med to faithfully reflect and repre­sent their views. More than that, howe­ver, they sought to influence and shape the opini­ons of members and support­ers. Yet it is precis­ely these “ordi­nary” party members who, in their subjec­tive expe­ri­en­ces, reflec­tions, moti­ves and decis­i­ons, have left only a rare histo­ri­cal trace in the survi­ving sources.

An invi­ta­tion to a women’s rally and discus­sion event in March 1946 entit­led “What unites us toge­ther?” with Käte Kern (SPD Central Execu­tive) and Elli Schmidt (KPD Central Committee).

We may also expect the prot­ago­nists of the forced unifi­ca­tion narra­tive to engage seriously with the ques­tion of what the SED actually repre­sen­ted at the time of its forma­tion in terms of party history and socio­logy, programme and statutes.

The report by the Party Execu­tive to the Second Party Congress of the SED, compi­led in the best social demo­cra­tic tradi­tion and with profes­sio­nal rigour, states the follo­wing: At its foun­da­tion in East Germany, the SED had just under 1.3 million members, who had joined the unity party in roughly equal numbers from the KPD and the SPD. In the first year of its exis­tence, an average of 1,200 men, women and youth joined this party every day. In 1947, in the states of the Soviet Occu­pa­tion Zone, one in four indus­trial workers, one in three white-collar workers, one in sixteen agri­cul­tu­ral and forestry workers, one in ten farmers, one in seven trade­speo­ple and busi­ness owners, one in seven engi­neers or tech­ni­ci­ans, and one in three teachers belon­ged to the SED. The party’s nume­ri­cal strength and the elec­tion results achie­ved by the SED in 1946 testify to the considera­ble accep­tance of this party. These figu­res carry even grea­ter weight when we consider that, follo­wing the party mergers of 1990 – which, inci­den­tally, took place not only without a plebi­s­cite but also without demo­cra­tic proce­du­res compa­ra­ble to those of the SED’s foun­ding – East German members defec­ted in droves. […]

A map show­ing various pro-unifi­ca­tion (in pink) and anti-unifi­ca­tion (in blue) party orga­ni­sa­ti­ons, events, decla­ra­ti­ons. Source: Günter Benser, Illus­tierte histo­ri­sche Hefte No. 40.

Leo Schwarz: A strategic defeat for the proletarian catch-all party

Leo Schwarz is a histo­rian and lives in Berlin. This article was origi­nally published on 14 April 2021 in the daily news­pa­per junge Welt to mark the 75th anni­ver­sary of the foun­ding of the SED. 

[…] For an infor­med discus­sion, the ques­tion of what kind of party the SED actually was in poli­ti­cal and program­ma­tic terms at the time of its foun­ding in April 1946 is at least as important as a mini­mum of clarity on the issue of “forced merger”. It is perhaps best descri­bed as a prole­ta­rian catch-all party with a socia­list self-image, orien­ted towards the crea­tion of a poli­ti­cal system of a bour­geois-parlia­men­tary nature (an “anti-fascist demo­cra­tic repu­blic”) and, in doing so, towards coope­ra­tion with all “anti-fascist demo­cra­tic parties” – and this within an all-German frame­work. In the “Prin­ci­ples and Objec­ti­ves” appro­ved by the unifi­ca­tion party congress, the party promi­sed to “campaign with all its energy against all sepa­ra­tist tenden­cies for the econo­mic, cultu­ral and poli­ti­cal unity of Germany”. The party inten­ded to take up the “struggle for socia­lism” only “on the basis” of this “demo­cra­tic republic”.

Dres­den, 1946: A party head­quar­ters of the KPD is made into a recruit­ment office for the newly foun­ded SED.

The conside­ra­ti­ons regar­ding the struc­ture of the econo­mic system left room for private capi­ta­list actors. In the “Mani­festo to the German People”, the SED expli­citly addres­sed “craft­smen and trade­speo­ple” as well. Only two rest­ric­tions were impo­sed at this point: the party set out to dismantle large-scale landow­ner­ship as part of a land reform and, further­more, to expro­priate “war crimi­nals and those who profi­ted from the war”. This was inten­ded to econo­mic­ally disem­power key pillars of fascism, but by no means to set the course towards a plan­ned economy. The party’s inten­tion was ther­e­fore not to be two things: an “instru­ment for enfor­cing dicta­tor­ship” and a driving force behind a special form of socia­list deve­lo­p­ment in a sepa­rate East German state. All claims to the contrary face the some­what embar­ras­sing problem that they are contra­dic­ted by both publicly acces­si­ble and archi­val sources. The fact that these narra­ti­ves are nevert­hel­ess main­tai­ned in one form or another merely demons­tra­tes the poli­ti­cal inte­rests of the histo­ri­ans who put them forward, and nothing else.

Exter­nal impetus

There is no doubt that the inter­nal orga­ni­sa­tion and poli­ti­cal approach of the SED chan­ged by 1949/50 and 1952 respec­tively. The impe­tus for this deve­lo­p­ment, howe­ver, came mainly from outside, namely from the occu­py­ing powers in the three Western zones and the Schu­ma­cher SPD, which used every means at their dispo­sal to prevent the forma­tion of the SED outside the “Soviet zone”. The SPD respon­ded to the foun­ding of the SED at its party congress in Hano­ver in May 1946 with a “rally” in which, on the one hand, “socia­lism as the task of the day” was proclai­med, thus seemingly outflan­king the SED “from the left” (albeit wisely refrai­ning from a concrete programme of action), and, on the other hand, used the slogan of “demo­cracy” – in line with the social demo­cra­tic anti-commu­nism of the 1920s and 1930s – to draw a sharp, confron­ta­tio­nal line of demar­ca­tion between the KPD and the SED. A reso­lu­tion was passed prohi­bi­ting all SPD members from advo­ca­ting a unity party with the communists.

The fact that the group of right-wing, bitterly anti-commu­nist offi­ci­als around Kurt Schu­ma­cher was able to assert itself within the West Zone SPD without major diffi­culty was due to the support of the occu­py­ing powers there. With their back­ing, in the autumn of 1945 it successfully under­mi­ned the autho­rity of the Berlin SPD Central Execu­tive in the Western Zones (and, in early 1946, also in the Western Sectors of Berlin), rejec­ted all “attempts to estab­lish joint party work” (Max Fech­ner in a letter to Kurt Schu­ma­cher in March 1946) and, in Febru­ary 1946, also rejec­ted the “Reich Party Congress” propo­sed by the Central Execu­tive, at which the ques­tion of unity was to be discus­sed and deci­ded. The unity campaign in the Western zones, which reached its peak in the summer of 1946 with seve­ral large rallies in places such as Essen, Braun­schweig, Munich and Nurem­berg, at which Otto Grote­wohl, Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht also appeared, came to nothing. The mili­tary govern­ments refu­sed to grant the SED a license, banned meetings “aimed at such a merger”, and obstruc­ted the KPD’s agita­tion for the “unity of the labour move­ment” at every turn. As a precau­tio­nary measure, the British mili­tary govern­ment even prohi­bi­ted the renaming of the KPD as the SED.

Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grote­wohl address workers in the city of Essen in July 1946 as part of the campaign for the unifi­ca­tion of the KPD and SPD in West Germany.

At the same time, the occu­py­ing powers supported the Schu­ma­cher group in the syste­ma­tic elimi­na­tion of all SPD offi­ci­als for whom the unity party (or at least some form of coope­ra­tion with the KPD or the SED) was not a self-evident taboo. “The Schu­ma­cher people are taking rigo­rous action against all offi­ci­als who propa­gate the idea of unity (expul­sion)”, a report from the US occu­pa­tion zone stated as early as April 1946. This ‘purge’, about which social demo­cra­tic histo­ri­ans have not utte­red a word to this day, was largely comple­ted by the end of 1946. As late as the spring of 1946, nume­rous SPD members and offi­ci­als – inclu­ding members of regio­nal execu­tive commit­tees – from Flens­burg to Munich had spoken out in favour of a unified party; on 1 May 1946, joint rallies had been held by the KPD and SPD in seve­ral cities. A year later, Schu­ma­cher had the party firmly under his control.

Stra­te­gic defeat

An inter­nal analy­sis of the “Situa­tion in the SED” descri­bed the dilemma before the end of 1946: “Our origi­nal inten­tion to imple­ment unifi­ca­tion in the western and southern zones of Germany imme­dia­tely after the unifi­ca­tion party congress has failed”. There was still hope for a “clari­fi­ca­tion process” within the SPD, which was to be supported by offers of joint action in work­places and trade unions: “Once this clari­fi­ca­tion process has reached the level of matu­rity we deem neces­sary, we would consider it appro­priate, subject to reco­gni­tion of the SED by the occu­py­ing autho­ri­ties in the West, to estab­lish the SED as a party in the western zones.” The crux of the matter was the “reco­gni­tion of the SED by the occu­py­ing autho­ri­ties in the West”, which never took place.

When, from 1948 onwards, the Soviet Union respon­ded to the anti-socia­list alignment of the “West” and the accom­pany­ing push to estab­lish a sepa­rate West German state by conso­li­da­ting its sphere of influence, the SED had to over­come a “concep­tual vacuum” (Mari­anne Brau­mann): The “anti-fascist, demo­cra­tic, united Germany” had proved unat­tainable, indeed a mirage. What follo­wed – the “party of a new type”, the foun­ding of the DDR, and finally the 1952 shift towards the “plan­ned cons­truc­tion of socia­lism” – was thus essen­ti­ally also a conse­quence of a stra­te­gic defeat suffe­red by the SED imme­dia­tely after its foun­ding. With this reori­en­ta­tion, howe­ver, the young party demons­tra­ted that it was capa­ble of respon­ding to defeats with an offen­sive stance rather than retreat and capi­tu­la­tion – a capa­bi­lity it had lost by 1989.

Declaration by the KPD and SPD: Strengthen the foundations for unity

This decla­ra­tion was published by the central commit­tees of the KPD and SPD on 26 Janu­ary 1946, shortly after a confe­rence between dele­ga­tes of both parties. It is a direct appeal to the rank-and-file to soberly approach the ques­tion of unity, to be pati­ent with one another, but to also actively address the burning ques­ti­ons of the workers’ move­ment regar­ding the past, the present, and the future. 

Dres­den, Janu­ary 1946: A joint meeting of the KPD and SPD. The banner reads: “Now is the histo­ri­cal moment to learn from the history of the labour move­ment and to create the unity party of the working class!”

We want to streng­then the foun­da­ti­ons for unity

To the members of the KPD and SPD!

Dear comra­des!

On 21 Decem­ber 1945, the party leader­ships and district dele­ga­tes of both parties reco­g­nised the neces­sity of unity within the labour move­ment. Since then, the members have expres­sed their views on the matter. There are no diffe­ren­ces of opinion regar­ding the neces­sity of unity. Now, in accordance with the reso­lu­tion adopted on 21 Decem­ber, we wish to deepen our mutual under­stan­ding and cooperation.

We are well aware that this requi­res a great deal of under­stan­ding and pati­ence, as well as a great deal of good­will and tole­rance on both sides. A long time passed between 1918 and 1945 – almost a whole gene­ra­tion. During the 12 years of Hitler’s rule, the neces­sity of unity became clear to us, but there was a complete lack of trai­ning. Follo­wing the collapse of the Hitler regime, many new members joined us who also wish to be socia­lists, but for the most part still need to learn what socia­lism and the labour move­ment are. Further­more, along­side much good coope­ra­tion in the work of buil­ding up the move­ment so far, there have also been many misun­derstan­dings and much fric­tion, as well as some regrettable missteps.

The reso­lu­tion of 21 Decem­ber now shows the members of both workers’ parties the way to unity. This reso­lu­tion has been misun­ders­tood by some as meaning that the merger of the two parties was to be deci­ded over the heads of the members. Howe­ver, no such inten­tion has ever exis­ted and does not exist under any circum­s­tances. We intend to do our utmost, ever­y­where, to ensure that the rank and file of both parties prepare for and decide on the merger. We ther­e­fore wish that both parties, in all zones, be gran­ted full free­dom in their acti­vi­ties to libe­rate the masses from Nazism and to promote the deve­lo­p­ment of demo­cracy, to secure peace and natio­nal unity, and that the condi­ti­ons for a firm unity of action and orga­ni­sa­tio­nal unity throug­hout Germany be crea­ted and finally deci­ded upon by the will of the members of both parties at Reich party congresses.

In any case, the inner readi­ness of the members for unity and merger is neces­sary before the amal­ga­ma­tion of the two parties can be carried out. That goes without saying. This includes the members of the two parties coming toge­ther to get to know and respect one another; for only on the basis of mutual respect can misun­derstan­dings be ruled out and the good­will for coope­ra­tion and unity be secu­red. Once misun­derstan­dings are dispel­led, the grounds for mistrust are also remo­ved, and coope­ra­tion between members and party repre­sen­ta­ti­ves in their offices in day-to-day poli­ti­cal work will follow natu­rally. Then the offi­ci­als, too, can come toge­ther for discus­sions and consul­ta­ti­ons in the know­ledge that fruitful work is being done for unity. For every step of comra­dely coope­ra­tion promo­tes the crea­tion of unity.

The reverse view from the same meeting in Dres­den in Janu­ary 1946. The banner reads: “Never again inci­te­ment and hosti­lity against the Soviet Union!”

The most important thing, howe­ver, will be intellec­tual agree­ment on the common path of the joint struggle, now in the present and for the socia­list goal, above all on the path to unity, on the common programme, the nature and the inter­nal struc­ture of the future party. The reso­lu­tion of 21 Decem­ber has alre­ady said a great deal on this. It states the follo­wing regar­ding the German charac­ter of the party: “The united party shall be auto­no­mous and inde­pen­dent. It is its task to deve­lop its policy, and tactics in accordance with the inte­rests of the German working people and the speci­fic condi­ti­ons in Germany.”

Regar­ding the rights of members, it states: “In its inter­nal consti­tu­tion, the party shall be based on the prin­ci­ple of the demo­cra­tic right of members to deter­mine policy and the free elec­tion of party leader­ship.” The meetings of members and offi­ci­als are ther­e­fore inten­ded prima­rily to serve the crea­tion of inter­nal unity between the two parties through under­stan­ding and cooperation.

A certain degree of order will be neces­sary in carry­ing out the ideo­lo­gi­cal consul­ta­tion of the members. To this end, in addi­tion to discus­sing econo­mic and poli­ti­cal condi­ti­ons and prac­ti­cal coope­ra­tion, we propose the follo­wing main topics:

  • The neces­sity of unity between the SPD and the KPD.
  • The Commu­nist Mani­festo and its signi­fi­cance for our times.
  • The working people in today’s Germany and the Berlin Statute.
  • The history of the German labour move­ment and its split.
  • Fascism as a weapon of capi­ta­lism against democracy.
  • Impe­ria­lism and the slogan “class struggle versus natio­na­li­stic struggle”.
  • Condi­ti­ons in the Soviet Union and in the capi­ta­list countries.
  • Women and socialism.
  • The mate­ria­list concep­tion of history from Marx and Engels to Lenin and Stalin.
  • The parlia­men­tary-demo­cra­tic repu­blic and the class struggle.
  • Social demo­cracy and socia­lism – the rule of the proletariat.
  • The natio­nal unity of the German nation.
  • The buil­ding of the workers’ parties.
  • The programme of the future united workers’ party.
  • The inter­na­tio­nal soli­da­rity of the proletariat.

Comra­des! In the firm belief that this will best serve the unity of the labour move­ment, let us now set to work. We want both: to reach an under­stan­ding and to over­come our diffi­cul­ties through coope­ra­tion. We also want to stand guard toge­ther against reac­tion and to suppress it where­ver it rears its head. We do not wish to waste any time; nor, howe­ver, do we wish to rush into anything. The unity of purpose among the member­ship must be firmly estab­lished and conso­li­da­ted if this unity is to endure and prove its strength. We wish to set an exam­ple of comra­de­ship. We wish to put a genuine end to the fratri­ci­dal struggle and achieve unity, for the good of Germany and the working masses.

Signed:

The Central Commit­tee of the Commu­nist Party of Germany

The Central Execu­tive of the Social Demo­cra­tic Party of Germany

  1. Anton Acker­mann (Febru­ary 1946).[↩]
  2. See G. Benser, Zusam­men­schluss von KPD und SPD 1946, Helle Panke. The “forced merger” charge was origi­nally level­led by anti-unifi­ca­tion dissi­dents within the SPD who had moved west­ward follo­wing their falling out with their pro-unifi­ca­tion comra­des. That this framing was from the outset more poli­ti­cal weapon than histo­ri­cal assess­ment is suggested by the admis­sion of the anti-commu­nist conser­va­tive poli­ti­cian Jakob Kaiser, who confes­sed to having little sympa­thy for the idea that the social demo­crats were help­less victims of Soviet coer­cion: “Why does social demo­cracy have no room to operate in Saxony, in Thurin­gia? Not least because only a vanis­hin­gly small number of the SPD’s leading figu­res in the East resis­ted the commu­nists’ desire for merger. But also because the then-leader­ship of eastern social demo­cracy played a substan­tial role in brin­ging about this merger. I myself witnessed the phases of this process at first hand. I would gladly draw a veil over the matter, were I not constantly faced with the neces­sity of preven­ting the forma­tion of a legend.” (Jakob Kaiser. Gewerk­schaf­ter und Patriot. Eine Werk­aus­wahl., hrsg. Tilman Mayer, Köln, 1988, S. 374.[↩]
  3. For an assess­ment of this self-criti­cal reflec­tion process in the KPD after the war, see: https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/501752.geschichte-der-arbeiterbewegung-ein-ganz-anderer-weg.html[↩]
  4. Sergei Tiul­pa­nov expres­sed this view in inter­nal reports to Moscow. Cited in G. Benser Einheits­drang? Einheits­zwang? Die Entste­hung der SED Betrach­tun­gen und Erin­ne­run­gen nach 50 Jahren, 1996, pg. 13.[↩]
  5. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] Zwischen Befrei­ung und Besat­zung, edited by Ulrich Bors­dorf and Lutz Niet­ham­mer, Wupper­tal 1976, p. 203.[↩]
  6. For more on this process of self-criti­cal reflec­tion, see: https://ifddr.org/en/november-revolution/[↩]
  7. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] See in detail Günter Benser, Der beson­dere deut­sche Weg zum Sozia­lis­mus. Konzept und Reali­tät, Berlin 2009 (Hefte zur DDR-Geschichte, Nr. 115).[↩]
  8. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] Einheit, Vol. 1946, No. 1, p. 30.[↩]
  9. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] Rolf Badstüb­ner and Wilfried Loth, Wilhelm Pieck – Aufzeich­nun­gen zur Deutsch­land­po­li­tik 1945–1953, Berlin 1994, p. 68.[↩]
  10. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] See: Einheits­drang oder Zwangs­ver­ei­ni­gung? Die Sech­zi­ger-Konfe­ren­zen von KPD und SPD 1945 und 1946. Mit einer Einfüh­rung von Hans-Joachim Krusch u. Andreas Maly­cha, Berlin 1990.[↩]
  11. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] Ibid., p. 60.[↩]
  12. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] Ibid., p. 161.[↩]
  13. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] Ibid., p. 163.[↩]
  14. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] Günter Benser, Der deut­sche Kommu­nis­mus. Selbst­ver­ständ­nis und Reali­tät. Bd. 4: Neube­ginn ohne letzte Konse­quenz (1945/46), Berlin 2010, S. 238.[↩]
  15. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] See Sieg­fried Thomas, Entschei­dung in Berlin. Zur Entste­hungs­ge­schichte der SED in der deut­schen Haupt­stadt 1945/46, Berlin (DDR) 1964, S. 217f.; Reiner Zilkenat, „Brüder, in eins nun die Hände!“ – Die Ausein­an­der­set­zun­gen um die Schaf­fung der SED, In: Konse­quent, Heft 2, 1986, S. 107 f.[↩]
  16. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] See Zwischen Befrei­ung und Besat­zung, pp. 71ff.[↩]
  17. [Foot­note Reiner Zilkenat] See also Gerhard Fisch and Fritz Krause, SPD and KPD 1945/46. Einheits­be­stre­bun­gen der Arbei­ter­par­teien. Illus­tra­ted with examp­les from South Hesse, Frank­furt am Main 1978. Contrary to what the subtitle of this richly docu­men­ted book suggests, the authors also examine the efforts towards unity in other regi­ons of the former Western zones and the corre­spon­ding repres­sive measu­res taken by the Ameri­cans, British and French.[↩]
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